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CORPORATIONS, MARKETS, AND COURTS*
Jeffrey N. Gordon**
The times they are a changin'. Vanguard firms of the 1980s takeover boom have announced associate layoffs and salary freezes because
business is down. Bankruptcy and corporate reorganization are the hot
new specialties as reflected in law school class size and law firm entrepreneurialism. Acquisition activity has fallen dramatically from the
halcyon days of the I 980s. 1 The gargantuan headline-grabbing hostile
bid is now rare. In particular, the "boot-strap, bust-up" highly leveraged transaction that so engaged the passions of corporate managers
and raiders now seems part of the history of corporate finance rather
than its future.
Many forces have played a role in this reversal. Of particular moment is the contraction of the takeover finance market that fueled leveraged transactions. This contraction is itself a complicated event. The
contributing elements include: the bankruptcy filing by Campeau and
Federated Department Stores practically before the ink was dry on the
deal documents, which suggested; correctly, that the financial projections undergirding this and many other recent highly leveraged transactions had been hopelessly optimistic; the savings and loan debacle,
which triggered a regulatory clampdown on the provision of credit in
leveraged deals; and the insider trading and market manipulation scan-
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This is part of a larger work in progress, "The Transition Costs of Capitalism."
1. "In one of the strongest signals of the softening of the mergers and acquisitions
market, tender offer activity plunged in 1990 to the lowest level since the early 1980s."
Tender Offer Update: 1991, Mergers & Acquisitions, May-June 1991, at 12. Sixty
tender offers were announced in 1990, versus 208 in 1988 and 152 in 1989. Id. at 13.
The high profile leveraged buyout market also weakened. From 1989 to 1990, the
number of transactions fell from 371 to 224; the dollar value fell from $65 billion to $15
billion. Id. at 52. Although the total number of completed mergers and acquisitions
was relatively constant from 1989 to 1990 (3,846 transactions in 1989; 3,851 in 1990),
the dollar value fell significantly, from $249.7 billion in 1989 to $170 billion in 1990.
Shifts in Deal Currents, Mergers & Acquisitions.July-Aug. 1991, at 8; see also Randall
Smith, The Corporate Raider of the '90s: Big Business, Wall St.J:, Dec. 4, 1990, at Cl
(describing decline in overall merger activity, exodus of raiders and leveraged buy-out
funds, but possible rise of large corporate strategic acquiror).
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dais that eventually brought down junk bond meister Michael Milken
.and Drexel Burnham Lambert.
These changes in corporate finance have been paralleled by
equally important shifts in the legal landscape surrounding mergers
and acquisitions. Under their authority to regulate the internal governance of corporations, many states have adopted legislative measures
that increasingly permit corporate managers unreviewable discretion to
reject hostile takeovers. 2 Of equal significance, state courts have interpreted fiduciary duty standards governing the behavior of directors to
similar effect. These changes in legal standards may prove more enduring barriers to a resurgence of hostile takeovers than current constraints in the financial markets.
In this Article, I focus on one especially important moment oflegal
change: the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. ,3 which allowed Time's management to
block Paramount's fully financed premium cash bid for Time in favor of
a management-backed combination with Warner Communications. In
insisting on a high level of deference to management's business judgment in the face of a hostile takeover bid, our (nearly) supreme court of
corporate law came close to explicitly sanctioning a 'just say no"
defense. 4
Because of its impact on a potential revival in the market for corporate control, this decision may be one of the signal economic events of
the 1990s. Giving the board broad power to reject hostile bids will reduce not only the number of hostile bids (and successful bids), but also
the number of corporate restructurings in response to, or anticipation
of, a hostile bid as well as the number of assorted "friendly" offers accepted in fear of a hostile bid. Thus, even if the takeover finance market revives or cash-laden corporate investors resurface, the Paramount
decision will remain a significant constraint on merger and acquisition
activity.
Paramount's reach goes further still. If it ushers out the hostile
takeover, it may usher in the proxy battle. The spotlight will fall on
proxy rules, as recent reform proposals presented to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) demonstrate, 5 and on the role of institutional investors. As the hostile takeover market closes down, institu2. By the end of the 1980s, 42 states had adopted some form of antitakeover statute. See infra text accompanying notes 124.
3. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
4. See id. at 1151-52.
5. See, e.g., Letter from United Shareholders Association to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC (Mar. 20, 1990) (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Letter from
California Public Employees' Retirement System to Linda C. Quinn, Director of the Division of Corporate Finance of the SEC (Nov. 3, 1989) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1073, 1075 (1990); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520, 536-42 (1990).
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tions will come to see the proxy battle as their only recourse to express
dissatisfaction with incumbent management. • This direct institutional
activity will trigger the next great debate in corporate law: whether energized participation in corporate governance by institutional investors
concentrates economic power and decision-making in too few hands. 6
Finally, the Paramount decision portends a change in the socio-legal
culture of corporate law. Along with hostile takeover bids came insider
trading, richly compensated investment bankers and lawyers, and an
environment in which shareholder wealth maximizing was the clear criterion of corporate performance. The court in Paramount picks up the
skein of recent state legislative activity that protects managerial prerogative while subordinating shareholder interests and gives it the authoritative stamp of Delaware.
What motivated such a far-reaching decision by the Delaware
Supreme Court? The decision hardly followed from some simple application of stare decisis. In fact, prior Delaware cases pointed in the opposite direction or, at the very least, suggested that the court would
decide in management's favor in Paramount on much narrower grounds.
This Article pursues three possible explanations for the court's action:
an economic account, a public choice account, and a socio-historical
account. The economic account, which argues that the court decided
that hostile takeovers disserved shareholders or some other group it
should protect, is undermined by the sizeable shareholder gains in
takeovers and the general uncertainty about their global economic effects. The public choice account-which argues that the court acted to
maintain Delaware's position as the most attractive situs for incorporation-is tempting, but ultimately does note satisfy as an explanation for
judicial behavior. I will argue that Paramount can best be understood as
a judgment that a self-regulating market, such as an unbridled market
in corporate control, threatens fundamental social values such as loyalty, continuity, and community, and, that at the very least, takeover
activity needed to be slowed down. I call this a socio-historical account:
the Paramount decision responds to the historical moment in which, for
reasons wise or unwise, people want to ensure that the human hand,
rather than the invisible hand of the market, authors their fate.
6. See generally Mark]. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91
Colum. L. Rev. 10 (1991) (arguing that recurring American political traditions militate
against concentration of economic power in a small number of institutions). For a skeptical view on the extent of institutional engagement in corporate governance, see John
C. Coffee,Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277 (1991). For a more optimistic view, see Bernard S. Black,
Agents Watching Agents: The Promise and Limits of Institutional Shareholder Voice,
UCLA L. Rev. (forthcoming 1992).
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Paramount and Its Predecessors

1. Time, Warner, and Paramount. - The Delaware Supreme Court's
decision in Paramount dramatically ended a battle among media giants
over an important event in the evolution of the global communications
industry. The players were Time Inc., whose fame as a magazine publisher had been outstripped by the economic potential of its cable television franchises and programming; Warner Communications, best
known for.its movie and.record businesses but also a major cable television franchise owner; and Paramount Communications, Inc., once the
quintessential conglomerate known as Gulf+ Western Industries now
focusing on the media business, as evidenced by its renaming after its
movie production subsidiary.
The first public move in the contest was the announcement in
March 1989 of a proposed merger between Time and Warner. The
merger proposal had evolved over a two-year period of corporate deliberation by Time and a tortuous set of merger negotiations primarily
concerning internal power-sharing arrangements. The proposed transaction was a stock for stock exchange in which Warner shareholders
would receive approximately sixty one percent of the common stock of
the combined enterprise (dubbed Time Warner, Inc.). The governance
arrangements called for equal representation by Time and Warner on
the board of the combined entity and the reign of co-chief executive
officers, Steve Ross from Warner and N. J. Nicholas, Jr. from Time.
The co-CEO arrangement would last until Ross's retirement five years
later, after which Nicholas would hold the post exclusively. Time directors would control a special board committee, the editorial committee,
that would oversee the publishing business in an effort to preserve the
"Time Culture."
The merger required majority shareholder approval by each firm.
In Warner's case, the conversion of Warner stock into Time stock
through the merger required a shareholder vote under Delaware law,7
In Time's case, the New York Stock Exchange listing agreement required a shareholder vote because under the proposal Time would issue new shares amounting to more than twenty percent of the existing
float. 8
Time and Warner adopted a number of measures to protect the
merger against unwanted third-party bids. These included a provision
that gave each firm the right to trigger an exchange by the firms of
approximately ten percent of their stock, a "no-shop" clause that prevented Time from considering other business combination proposals,
and so-called "dry-up" agreements with several banks not to finance
any third-party bids to acquire Time. Shareholders of the two firms
7. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251 (1983).
8. New York Stock Exchange, Listed Company Manual § 313.03(c) (1990).
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received proxy statements in late May, with a shareholder vote scheduled for late June.
Paramount severely jolted these merger plans on June 7 when it
announced an all-cash, all-shares tender offer for Time at $175 a share,
approximately $50 more than the stock market closing price on that day
and approximately $60-$70 more than the trading range for Time stock
in the two months prior to the Time Warner merger proposal.
Paramount conditioned its bid on Time's extrication from the Warner
transaction and on appropriate assurances regarding the .transfer of
Time's cable franchises. Paramount announced that all aspects of its
bid, including price, were negotiable.
Time's board rejected the Paramount bid out of hand as inadequate, as denying its shareholders the superior long term economic opportunities offered by a combination with Warner, and as threatening
Time's survival and culture. Time's board had received advice from its
investment bankers that a sale of the company could possibly realize
$250 per share or more and that the trading range for Time Warner
stock would be $159-$247 a share for 1991. (Although not mentioned
in the co1Jrts' opinions, the bankers also advised that the stock would
trade at about $150 immediately after the transaction. 9 ) Nevertheless,
the Time board apparently assumed that if its shareholders were given
the chance, they would vote against the merger and accept the
Paramount offer. Thus the Time board sought a defensive measure
that would eliminate a shareholder vote and make a hostile bid economically infeasible. The solution was a new version of the Time
Warner transaction recast as a cash and securities acquisition of Warner
by Time. Time would make an all cash tender offer for fifty-one percent of Warner's outstanding stock at $70 a share, with a subsequent
acquisition of the remaining forty-nine percent with a package of cash
and securities valued at $70 a share. The governance provisions of the
original merger agreement would remain intact. Time conditioned its
tender offer only on obtaining the required fifty-one percent, meaning
that, in the absence of an injunction, Time had obligated itself to go
fonvard irrespective of any third-party bid for Time.
On June 23, Paramount raised its offer to $200 a share and reiterated that its offer was negotiable. Time's board rejected the offer as
before, listing as an additional ground the unconditional tender offer
for Warner. Paramount quickly sought a preliminary injunction against
the Time tender offer in the Delaware Chancery Court. Chancellor
Allen, author of several key Delaware takeover cases, denied the injunction. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court decision from the bench after or'.11 argument onJuly 24, 1989. Its opinion
9. See Theodore N. Mirvis, Time/Warner: The Delaware Supreme Court Speaks, 4
M&A & Corp. Gov. L. Rep. 285, 285 (1990).
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followed in February 1990. On the day the opinion came down, Time
Warner stock closed at $92.75 per share.
Although faithful application of prior Delaware law would have
produced the injunction, on its facts, the outcome in Paramount was not
especially remarkable. The defensive measure in question was a tender
offer designed to effectuate a business combination that had been
under consideration for two years, rather than a purely defensive tactic
like a poison pill 10 or a hastily pulled together restructuring designed
to compete with and block a prior bid. 11 Time's management did not
extract a significant economic stake in the new entity. 12 The vote that
Time shareholders were deprived of by the shift from a merger to a
tender offer was an artifact of a New York Stock Exchange corporate
governance standard, not Delaware corporate law. 13 Of significance
and surprise, however, is the extent to which the Delaware Supreme
Court, in arriving at this outcome, apparently abandoned its prior efforts to monitor management behavior in the face of a hostile bid and
thus opened the door to a ':_just say no" takeover defense.
2. Doctrine Prior to Paramount. -Throughout the takeover boom
of the 1980s the Delaware courts struggled with the question of the
appropriate deference owed to a board in responding to a hostile bid.
Prior doctrine had established the business judgment rule as the basis
for judicial review of target management conduct. Unless a shareholder plaintiff could demonstrate that board members acted "solely or
primarily out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in office," 14 virtually
any takeover defense tactic could pass muster under this standard. In
the mid-l 980s, the extremity of some defensive measures plus the "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests" 15 led the Delaware Supreme Court to embrace a more exacting
standard of judicial scrutiny. The formula, first articulated in the
landmark case of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 16 required the board
10. See City Capital Assocs. v. lnterco, lnc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) (board's
refusal to redeem poison pill not proportionate response to plaintiff's non-coercive
tender offer); see infra text accompanying note 25.
11. See Grand Metropolitan, PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(enjoining restructuring plan designed to sell off holdings within five years as well as
poison pill); see infra text accompanying note 26.
1
12. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, lnc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988) (enjoining transactions that would have given management large stake in reorganized
entities).
13. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding
that adding extra directors to board, though done in good faith, unduly thwarted shareholders' voting rights) and Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971)
(holding that management could not change meeting date to evade proxy contest). But
see Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, 579 A.2d 1115 (Del. Ch. 1990) (permitting management's
postponement of annual meeting called by 30% of shareholders).
14. Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964).
15. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
16. Id.
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first to demonstrate that the bid posed a threat to the corporation and
its shareholders and then to demonstrate that the particular defensive
tactic was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. 17
In facing assorted defensive tactics thereafter, the Delaware courts
grappled doctrinally with the kind of threat that could justify a board's
defensive response and the proportionality of the response to the particular threat. In Unocal the threat was the coercive structure of the
bidder's offer, a two-tier bid whose back end consisted ofjunk bonds of
dubious value, which could induce shareholders into tendering on unfavorable terms. 18 The approved response was a self-tender by the target that excluded the bidder from participation, in effect reversing the
pressure to tender. 19 Similarly, in Moran v. Household International,
Inc. ,20 the Supreme Court upheld the preemptive adoption of a "flipover" poison pill as an appropriate response to the threat of a potential two-tier front-loaded offer. 21 In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
17. See id. at 955.
18. So-called "two-tier, front-loaded binds," in which the bidder offers a higher
price to the first 51 % of stock tendered and a lower price to stock subsequently acquired
through a follow up merger, may pressure target shareholders to tender despite a belief
that the bid is inadequate. This is because each shareholder wants to avoid inclusion in
the lower priced "back end," and also knows that other shareholders will face a similar
choice. In such cases, the coercive effect of this "prisoner's dilemma," rather than the
bid's desirability, may lead to the bid's success. See David Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 186-89 (1986). In Unocal,
Mesa Petroleum made a two-tiered bid in which the back end, consisting of
subordinated debt in a Mesa subsidiary in.to which Unocal would be merged, purported
to be of equivalent value of the front end, cash. The court thought otherwise. Unocal,
493 A.2d at 949.
In addition to the enhanced business judgment test announced in the case, Unocal is
also important because of its impact on takeover finance. Mesa's bid was vulnerable to
board counterattack because it required Unocal shareholders to finance half the
purchase price through their acceptance of subordinated debt, even assuming the equivalence between the front and back tier. Unocal made it clear that an all-cash bid would
be much stronger. This meant that the subordinated debt needed by the acquiror to
finance the bid would be raised from the capital market rather than from the shareholders of the target. The public junk bond market satisfied this need. Id. at 949-51. lfone
believes that the apparent bidder overpayment in highly leveraged transactions in the
late 1980s was facilitated by imperfections in the public junk bond market, then Unocal
was a critical step.
19. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956-57.
20. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
21. See id. at 1357. Poison pills are commonly set up as follows: The board issues
shareholders a new class of contingent rights to purchase common stock (or preferred
stock) at a price that allegedly reflects the board's belief as to the long-term value of the
firm. These rights become exercisable, or "triggered," when a hostile bidder acquires a
specified percentage of the target's stock (in early pills, generally 20%, but in recent
pills, as low as 10%), or when the bidder announces an offer to acquire a specified percentage of the target (usually 30%).
A "flip-over" provision means that if the bidder subsequently merges with the target, each right would "flip over" and permit the holder to buy, for the exercise price,
common stock of the bidder worth twice (typically) the exercise price. This economic
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Corp. 22 the threat was the coercion of a partial bid, which, because nontendering shareholders were left with shares valued at less than the bid
price, amounted to a two-tier front-loaded offer.2 3 In such cases of
"structural coercion," 24 the threat to shareholders from a hostile bid is
easy to understand, and the shape of a proportionate response readily
described.
Prior to Paramount the Chancery- Court had determined the other
respects in which a bid would constitute a threat under Unocal and the
scope of a proportionate board response. In the most important case,
City Capital Assocsiate v. Interco, 25 the court ordered redemption of a
poison pill to permit shareholders to choose between an all-cash, allshares hostile bid and a management-proposed restructuring. In Interco, Chancellor Allen described two types of Unocal threats that might
penalty will deter the bidder from merging with the target, and will particularly protect
target shareholders from the pressure to tender that arises from the alternative of getting the lower back-end price from a two-tier, front-loaded offer in a subsequent freezeout merger. Flip-over pills suffer from the tactical weakness that a patient bidder can
obtain control of the board, "freeze-in" the non-tendering shareholders, and gradually
acquire their stock and rights over time. A "flip-in" provision provides that if the bidder subsequently passes a specified ownership threshold, each right (other than rights
held by the bidder) would "flip in" and permit the holder to buy, for the exercise price,
common stock of the target worth twice (typically) the exercise price. Various poison
pills feature different percentages triggering the flip-in, ranging from 50% to as low as
the initial rights trigger percentage. The flip-in is structured to dilute significantly the
bidder's economic stake in the target; in this regard, the discrimination against the bidder in the exercise of flip-in rights is essential. The flip-in pill solves the tactical weakness of the flip-over pill.
'
Although apparently no pill has ever been triggered in the course of a control contest, the pill is not a perfect deterrent to a hostile bid. Until the rights are triggered and
become exercisable, the board may redeem them for nominal consideration. (This feature is built into the structure of every poison pill, out of the belief that courts would not
permit a plan with non-redeemable rights.) Thus, a bid at a sufficiently large premium
will generate great pressure on the board to redeem the rights. A pill, particularly with a
flip-in feature, will force a bidder to negotiate with the board rather than making a hostile tender offer to shareholders. If the board can refuse to redeem the rights, however,
then the pill will preclude a hostile bid. See generally, Robert F. Bruner, The Poison Pill
Anti-Takeover Defense: The Price of Strategic Deterrence Uan. 1991) (mimeo, Darden
Business School, on file with the Columbia Law Review); Victor I. Lewkow & William A.
Groll, "Poison Pills" and Other Structural Defenses: Uses and Abuses In The Age of
Saying "No" (Sept. 1989) (mimeo, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (discussing recent developments in "poison pills").
22. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
23. The defensive measure sustained in Ivanhoe Partners, id., consisted of a large
cash dividend and substantial open market purchases by the target's largest shareholder
(financed by the dividend) coupled with a standstill agreement that locked in place the
existing board majority. This would fend off a ho~tile bid from a third party for a control block, but not for JOO% ownership in the target.
24. The phrase is from Ronald]. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44
Bus. Law. 247, 267 (1989).
25. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
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justify defensive actions against a tender offer for all shares: threats to
the voluntariness of shareholder action, that is, structural coercion, and
threats from economically inadequate but non-coercive offers. The
court held that the threat of a possibly inadequate bid justified maintenance of a preclusive tactic like a poison pill for only a limited period to
give the board time to negotiate with the bidder, explore third-party
opportunities, or generate a competing transaction that created additional value. When the bid seemed prima fade adequate to a reviewing
court, its possible inadequacy would not justify permanently preclusive
action.
'
· ·
·' ·

Interco was quickly followed by Grand Metropolitan, PLC v. Pillsbury
Co. ,26 in which the court ordered Pillsbury to redeem a poison pill and
additionally enjoined it from proceeding with the spin-off of a key.division in response to an all-cash, all-shares bid from Grand Metropolitan.
The Chancery Court found that under the circumstances the bid's alleged inadequacy was the only cognizable threat. Since no third party
had offered a better price despite Pillsbury's efforts over a long period,
and since an alternative management restructuring proposal was not
clearly economically superior in the court's judgment, this threat was
held not to justify continuing preclusive tactics.
In both Interco and Grand Metropolitan the court measured the threat
to shareholder interests from a hostile all-cash, all-shares bid in simple
economic terms: whether the shareholders would receive an adequate
and fair price. 27 The cases did not conceive of the corporation as having defensible interests separate from the economic interests of its
shareholders. The court regarded the restructuring plans proposed by
management in response to the hostile bid as defensive measures only,
not as corporate plans or policies that would justify protection through
preclusive tactics. In other words, the court did not find that the threat
to the effectuation of these plans posed by the hostile bid offered an
independent basis for maintenance of a preclusive defensive measure
like a poison pill. 2s
26. 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
27. Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989), also
focused on economic inadequacy as the only legally cognizable threat ofan all-cash, allshares offer. The court held that ordinarily the threat of bid inadequacy abated over
time as competing offers, including management's, could be presented and evaluated,
but that an unresolved patent infringement action between Polaroid and Kodak generated an economic uncertainty that created a special threat of inadequacy justifying
preclusive tactics. See id. at 261.
28. In AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986),
the Chancery Court decided that an all-cash bid posed a threat to a restructuring transaction proposed by target management prior to the hostile bid that called for a large
dividend payout to shareholders, an ESOP, and a continuing shareholder stake in a
highly leveraged enterprise. The court, however, enjoined the target's defensive response-restructuring its transaction as a partial self-tender offer effective prior to the
raider's bid-on the ground that the coercive effect of the self-tender was not a propor-
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The Chancery Court opinion in Paramount wrought a significant
but limited change in this analysis. 29 Chancellor Allen found that the
threat that the Paramount bid presented to the effectuation of Time
and Warner's preexisting plan for a business combination did justify
the defensive recasting of the transaction into a tender offer that would
narrow shareholder choice.30 Because the original Time and Warner
transaction was the result of strategic business planning, not an effort
by incumbents to enhance their control, 31 it was a corporate policy that
could legitimately be defended. The novelty of the case is in the holding that the corporation had a protectible interest in the accomplishment of a preexisting strategic plan, thereby expanding the concept of
a Unocal threat beyond the shareholders' immediate economic interests.
In this respect the case is a significant retreat from Interco. Having
found a threat to a protectible interest, the court then held that the
tender offer was a proportionate response: unlike the hastily conceived
restructuring proposals in Pillsbury, the tender offer stemmed directly
from a bona fide corporate plan; and, unlike a poison pill, the tender
offer was not necessarily preclusive. 32
Chancellor Allen specifically contrasted the Time tender offer and
maintenance of a poison pill, calling the pill "a control mechanism and
not a device with independent business purposes. " 33 In /nterco,
Chancellor Allen had made a similar distinction: he refused to enjoin a
restructuring that was likely to complicate and perhaps interfere with a
hostile bid because he did not think it would preclude the bid, but he
enjoined a pill, which would have been preclusive. Although Paramount
purports to preserve this distinction, it collapses under the facts. The
Interco pill was objectionable because it was in fact preclusive (though
other pills, such as a flip-over pill or even a flip-in pill that did not carry
a prohibitive financial penalty, 34 might not be). Unlike the Interco restructuring, the Time tender offer for Warner would preclude an alternative bid in virtually all circumstances.35 The Chancery Court sports
with the facts in suggesting otherwise. Interco and Pillsbury asserted the
tional response. See also Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans (Macmillan I), 552 A.2d
1227 (Del. Ch. 1988), discussed infra note 31.
29. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder)
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,r 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989).
30. See id. at 93,282-84.
31. This was in contrast to Robert M. Bass Group, 552 A.2d 1227, where the original
transaction represented an effort by insiders to gain a large stake in a restructured enterprise, and AC Acquisitions, 519 A.2d 103, where the original plan also grew out of the
desire of incumbents to retain control after the expiration of certain family trusts.
32. The court cited the recently concluded $25 billion RJR Nabisco transaction as
suggesting that a bid for the combined Time Warner company was still possible.
33. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,284 n.22.
34. See supra note 21 (explaining pills).
35. A hostile bid for a highly-leveraged Time Warner, with at least $10 billion in
new debt on the balance sheet, see Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH), at 93,283 is not readily comparable to the RJR Nabisco transaction, which began
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right of shareholders to choose between a non-coercive hostile bid and
a management-sponsored alternative. Paramount cuts back on this
right: when the alternative has the appropriate lineage, shareholders
may lose the right to choose.36
3. Paramount as Doctrinal Retreat. - Despite its ultimate resolution in favor of board choice over shareholder choice, the Chancery
Court addressed the novel situation presented in Paramount in a way
that gave significant weight to the "omnipresent specter" of the board's
self-interest in a control contest. Rather than simply defer to the
board's statement of the benefits of the Time Warner combination, the
court subjected the matter to enhanced business judgment review
before deciding that Paramount's non-coercive offer could present a
legally cognizable threat. Indeed, the court reached an independent
conclusion "that achievement of the long term strategic plan of the
Time-Warner consolidation is plainly a most important corporate
policy." 37
The subsequent Delaware Supreme Court affirmance moves in
quite a different direction. The Chancery's careful canvass of the factors that would justify Time's defensive tender offer is swept aside in a
way that suggests a fresh expansion of the board's power to rebuff a
hostile takeover bid. The Supreme Court enlarges the range of threats
that a board might credit in undertaking preclusive defensive measures.
Of perhaps even greater importance, the Supreme Court cuts back the
scope of judicial review of the board's assertion that a particular threat
exists. The Supreme Court seems to reject the Chancery's enhanced
review of board decisions in favor of a simple business judgment test
that unwinds Unocal. In combination these elements invite the board to
barricade itself behind a poison pill and "just say no."
as a management buyout proposal for a company with little debt and enormous cash
flow.
36. Arguably the shift in the Chancery Court's attitude had occurred in a previous
case, TW Services, Inc. v. SWf Acquisition Corp., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ,i 94,334 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989), in which Chancellor Allen refused to force
a target to redeem a poison pill despite acceptance of a hostile tender offer by approximately 88% of the outstanding shares. The court held that since the putative acquiror
had conditioned its offer on board approval, a satisfactory subsequent merger agreement and the ability of the acquiror to obtain financing, its offer amounted to a merger
proposal, which the target board is not obliged to accept. See id. at 92,182. Indeed, in
considering such a merger proposal, the relevant test was not Unocal, but the ordinary
business judgment rule. Thus the court had no occasion to consider the kind of threat
that would justify a proportionate response. Nevertheless, many would regard TW
Services as a siguificant departure from lnterco and Grand Metropolitan, since the conditions
in the bid were not unconventional. For interesting accounts of the evolution from Interco to the Chancery Court opinion in Paramount, see Lyman Johnson, The Delaware
Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 865,
917-32 (1990); Steven]. Massey, Chancellor Allen'sJwisprudence and the Theory of
Corporate Law, 17 Del.J. Corp. L. (forthcoming in 1992).
37. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,283.
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The Suprem~ Court explicitly rejected the prior line of Chancery
cases that indicated that the only legally cognizable threat presented by
an all-cash, all-shares hostile bid was economic inadequacy, and that,
for such a threat, only temporary preclusion of the shareholder right to
choose would be a proportionate response. In particular, the Supreme
Court vastly expanded the range of cognizable threats to include the
possibility that shareholders would be misled by the conditional nature
and timing of Paramount's hostile bid, or by "ignorance or a mistaken
belief of the strategic benefit" of the Time Warner combination. 38
This, in tum, would significantly expand the circumstances in which a
board could undertake preclusive defensive measures, a striking result
given the low probability that the sophisticated shareholders who are
the critical actors in most control transactions would be confused or
misled. Moreover, if shareholder mistake or confusion is a legitimate
threat for the board to address, then it would follow that the argnment
in favor of protective preclusive action would be even stronger for internal business plans than for a preexisting merger agreement. In the
merger case there are grounds for skepticism whether the board can
evaluate better than shareholders the potential synergies from the combination, particularly since disclosure of material financial and other
business data is made in the course of the transaction. In the case of
internal business plans, on the other hand, a board might well be hampered for competitive reasons from disclosing as much information,
thus making shareholder error more likely. Thus, unlike the Chancery
Court, the Supreme Court opened the way to preclusive resistance to
hostile bids in cases other than a preexisting merger agreement.
More subtle but perhaps more potent is the Supreme Court's rebuke to the Chancery's enhanced review of board judgment in determining whether a bid is economically inadequate. In Interco and
Pillsbury the Chancery enjoined defensive measures after closely evaluating the bid and the board-sponsored alternative and concluding that
the board's claim of economic superiority for its proposal was insufficiently persuasive to justify the continuation of preclusive tactics. 39
The Supreme Court criticized this approach "because it would involve
the court in substituting its judgment as to what is a 'better' deal for
that of a corporation's board of directors."40 Yet that is not what the
Chancery did in those cases; Chancery merely permitted the shareholders
to choose, after rejecting the board's assertion that, in effect, shareholders should be protected from a mistake. The Supreme Court at38. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d I 140, 1153 (Del.
1989).
39. See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d I070 (Del. 1988); Grand Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d
1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
•
40. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1153 (criticizing Interco and its progeny).
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tack on "Interco ... and its progeny"41 seems ultimately an attack on the
principle of shareholder choice. The board · has the right to decide
whether a particular bid is a threat to shareholder interests, says the
Supreme Court; in examining such a board decision, the court should
apply a deferential standard of review. "Indeed ... precepts underlying the business judgment rule militate against a court's engaging in
the process of attempting to appraise and evaluate the relative merits of
a long-term versus a short-term investment goal for shareholders."42
Thus the Supreme Court in Paramount rejected the Chancery's independent review of the economic value of the Time Paramount combination as the basis for permitting preclusive protection.
This insistence on deferential review of the board's judgment of
economic threats from a hostile bid also has implications for the
board's judgment of non-economic threats, such as the risk of shareholder mistake or deception. After all, if a court cannot review a comparative economic claim, which is at least subject to quantitative
analysis, how can it review matters of more subtle judgment? In short,
if the board otherwise appears to be acting in good faith and has engaged in reasonable investigation, Paramount appears to leave no place
for the court's independent assessment of the board's assertion that a
hostile bid presents a series of threats that warrant a preclusive
response.
The Supreme Court's approach, which seems to make the board
the arbiter of the existence of threats to the corporation and its shareholders, will also undermine judicial review of the proportionality of
the board's response, the second prong of Unocal. lf the board has the
power to define the threat, and if the threat will continue unless the
offer is blocked, how can the court object to a preclusive response?
This makes somewhat hollow the Supreme Court's assertion that the
tender offer was proportionate because it did not preclude a Paramount
offer for the combined Time Warner company (although it would preclude an offer for Time). A new offer for the combined company would
not interfere with the accomplishment of the preexisting transaction.
Given the Supreme Court's approach, however, Time Warner management might well be able to find additional threats raised by the new
offer that would justify new preclusive tactics. To be sure, the Supreme
Court continues to condemn defensive responses that transfer wealth
or control to insiders, 43 but mere self-interested preservation of the
41. Id.
42. ld.
43. In reviewing the proportionality of the Time tender offer, the Supreme Court
maintained the view that "management actions that are coercive in nature or force upon
shareholders a management-sponsored alternative to a hostile offer may be struck down
as unreasonable and non-proportionate responses." Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154 (citing as objectionable the egregious management efforts to shift control and/9r economic
fruits in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988) and AC
Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986)). This
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status quo will be virtually impossible to distinguish from protection
against a raider's threats, if the presumption favors the board.44 In
short, Paramount lands on the side of board prerogative in the face of a
hostile takeover bid, interposing the board against shareholders who
may want the opportunity to sell and against courts who may want to
scrutinize the board's defensive tactics. 45
The net effect appears to be the collapse of the Delaware Supreme
follows Delaware's traditional requirement that a board in palpable economic conflict
with shareholders must demonstrate the "entire fairness" of the transaction, but it does
not address the case where the board merely wants to protect the status quo.
44. In going through the formal motions of its proportionality review, the Supreme
Court rested on the Chancery Court's finding that the Time tender offer did not definitely preclude Paramount from making its bid. Assuming $30 billion were forthcoming, the shark could just have stretched its jaws wider. But in fact Paramount was
blocked; the preclusive tactic worked.
45. The Delaware Supreme Court's emphasis on board prerogative as the touchstone in corporate control transactions is underlined by its treatment of the so-called
Revlon issue in the case, that is, whether Time's decision to enter into the originally
proposed merger with Warner imposed on the board "a duty to maximize immediate
shareholder value and an obligation to auction the company fairly," Paramount, 571 A.2d
at I 150. (The reference is to Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), which described circumstances in which defensive tactics must
give way to an effort to auction the target.) The basic argument for the attachment of
Revlon duties is straightforward: The exchange ratio gave Warner shareholders 62% of
the combined company, suggesting that Warner was the dominant party and thus the
"buyer"; the Time board thought that the market might regard Time as having been put
up for sale; and the transaction deprived Time shareholders of a potential premium
from an alternative transaction.
The Chancery Court rejected the Revlon claim through a test that focused on the
existence of a control shift: if control of A shifted from A's shareholders to B's, then
Revlon applied. In this particular case, the merger did not result in a control shift, since
Time and Warner were under common control-"a fluid aggregation of unaffiliated
shareholders representing a voting majority," Paramount [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 93,279.
The Chancery Court's control test was based on its reading of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261, as imposing Revlon duties "when the board decides
to enter a change in control transaction," despite the board's "subjective disinclination
to sell the company," Paramount [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), at
93,277. Macmillan purported to impose Revlon duties "whether the 'sale' takes the form
of an active auction, a management buyout, or a 'restructuring' such as that which the
Court of Chancery enjoined in Macmillan I." Macmillan, 599 A.2d at 1285. The
Supreme Court adopted a different test that focused on the intention of the board: Revlon applies only if the board actively initiates a bidding process for the firm or, as in
Revlon itself, goes about breaking up the firm in response to a hostile bid. In other
words, unless the board expressly says, "the firm is for sale, in whole or piece by piece,"
it will be under no obligation to maximize shareholder value in a control transaction.
Thus the Supreme Court opinion rejects the change in control test articulated by the
Chancery Court in favor of a test that in most cases looks to the board's announced
intentions and in other cases looks to the management's threat to grab disproportionate
benefits. This explains why Revlon covers both a management buyout and a restructuring like Macmillan I. In particular, the Supreme Court's Paramount opinion would seem
to exclude from Revlon's reach virtually any combination negotiated at arm's length
where the consideration was principally stock. Such a transaction will not be styled as a
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Court's five-year-old effort to erect and sustain an intermediate standard of review for takeover defense tactics.46 We may be back to the
earlier era of simple business judgment review of defensive measures.
That restraint is no restraint at all to a well-advised board, especially if
outside directors agree.47 Indeed, because of the preclusive effect of
current defense technology, a board may now be in position simply to
refuse an unwanted bid.
Did the Delaware Supreme Court intend to go this far? Predictions
about this inscrutable body frequently fall flat. For example, many
were surprised that Unocal-which approved a remarkable inroad on
the seminal principle that all shareholders must be treated ratablycould be employed to constrain target defensive tactics.4 8 Perhaps the
Supreme Court did not intend Paramount to convey broad approval of
preclusion, but the court's avoidance of several potential doctrinal
stopping points suggests that it may have indeed intended such a farreaching result. Most obviously, the court could have explicitly embraced the distinction that Chancellor Allen drew between the Time
tender offer and a poison pill as preclusive tactics. As a formalist legal
matter, a poison pill, which depends for its operation on discrimination
between shareholders of the same class, like the discriminatory selftender in Unocal, ought to be suspect because it encroaches on the
traditional corporate law norm of ratable shareholder treatment. By
contrast, a business decision such as Time's tender offer does not operate via a financial penalty on a disfavored shareholder but affects all
shareholders equally, forcing greater accountability on a board. 49
"sale," and, barring some unusual side deal, management would not disproportionately
benefit.
46. Some might argue that Delaware's proportionality standard of review was acreation of the Chancery Court and the commentators rather than the Supreme Court. A
simpler rule could harmonize the results in the Supreme Court's takeover decisions:
managers always win, unless they try a business reorganization that appropriates wealth
from shareholders. Then Paramount represents no change at all. This article proceeds
on the assumption that the Supreme Court intended its opinions to give guidance on the
true (if more complex) rule. It also seems probable that if the Supreme Court disapproved of proportionality review, it would have intervened before Paramount to spare
managements from the pressure of Chancery Court and federal court decisions applying
this standard.
Others have argued that the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion is so confused on
proportionality review as to defy conclusion. See Ronald]. Gilson & Bernard C. Black,
The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 42I-24 (Supp. I99I).
47. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus.
Law. 101, 124 (1979).
48. Although in significant part this is due to the creativity of the Chancery Court,
the Supreme Court apparently approved of this take on Unocal. See supra note 46.
49. ln defending selective treatment of a raider, the Unocal court cited the previous
acceptance of targeted share repurchases-greenmail-in Chelf v. Mathes, 199 A.2d
548, 554 (Del. 1964). See Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953-54 (Del.
1985). But in the case of greenmail, the advantaged minority shareholder consents to
sell back its stock at a premium pursuant to a proposal from a board acting for the
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But the pill warrants special attention chiefly because its preclusive
effect frequently exceeds that of other takeover defensive tactics.
Although in some cases the preclusive effects of a pill and another tactic
are identical (as in Paramount, for example, in which a $30 billion price
tag for the combined companies made a subsequent bid impossible),
the wealth shifting aspects of the pill make it effective even in circumstances where other defensive tactics might not work. In Interco, for
example, the court assumed that whereas a spinoff of a key division of
the target at fair market value would not preclude a bid, a pill would.
Since the pill is doubly effective-it is preclusive, but if triggered does
not impose direct costs on other shareholders-a court should be leery
of a standard that assimilates the pill to other conventional defensive
tactics. 50 The Supreme Court's failure to draw the distinction between
the pill and other tactics may speak volumes. After all, if a good faith
plan of internal development and growth deserves the same protection
as a business combination, then a low cost preclusive defensive tactic,
such as an unredeemed flip-in poison pill, may correspond in appropriate circumstances to Time's tender offer.
The Supreme Court also notably failed to draw a sharp distinction
between a threat to a pre-existing transaction and a threat to other
strategies that the board has already decided on, including a pre-existing business plan to remain independent. To be sure, the court rehearses at some length the deliberations that led to the Time Warner
merger proposal and the judgment not to combine with other firms,
including Paramount. Yet this part of the opinion addresses whether
the Time board proceeded in good faith and after reasonable investigation. · Nothing in the opinion indicates that the preclusive actions that
discriminated-against majority presumably on the theory that the majority will benefit
(the "intrinsic value" exceeds the greenmail price). In the discriminatory self-tender,
and by extension all tactics that rely on a discriminatory effect, the minority shareholder
is excluded without its consent from a benefit extended by the board to the favored
majority. There is no claim that the party discriminated against will ultimately benefit
(unlike greenmail); rather, the party has mounted a particular kind of threat to the corporation and its shareholders that warrants an extraordinary countermeasure. It seems
right in such circumstances to require the incumbent board to make a strong showing
both of the existence of a threat and of the proportionality of its response. Thus, the
deference to the board's business judgment that may be appropriate in Che.ff and even
conceivably in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981), despite the scorched earth and bad defensive acquisition, may in the
end be more defensible than similar deference to a board decision to maintain a poison
pill.
50. Like most other anticipatory defensive tactics, the pill imposes ex ante costs on
all shareholders, as demonstrated by the negative average stock price returns upon pill
adoption, because of the diminished probab,ility of a premium takeover bid. In the case
of particularly effective pills, or those that are indeed preclusive if unredeemed, the negative effects will be greater. See infra text accompanying note 67. ln operation, the pill
would impose costs ex post in a highly discriminatory way, so that the bidder suffers
significant dilution vis-a-vis the remaining shareholders. For further discussion of
poison pills, see supra note 21.

1991]

CORPORATIONS AND MARKETS

1947

were justified to protect a pre-existing transaction might not also be
warranted to protect pre-existing internal business plans that have been
devised in the same careful way. Indeed, in rejecting Paramount's
claim that the tender offer unreasonably deprives shareholders of the
immediate opportunity to accept a premium bid, the court responded
in broad terms:
Delaware law confers the management of the corporate enterprise to the stockholders' duly elected board representatives
.... The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated to the
stockholders . . . . Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for short-term shareholder
profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate
strategy ....51
This is a broad statement of the scope of shareholders' delegation to
managers and an equally broad statement of the difficulty shareholders
will face in revoking this delegation. Nothing in its tone or logic suggests that the court intended to privilege a merger or other extraordinary transaction over a well thought-out plan for independent activity.
Thus the Delaware Supreme Court in Paramount has gone quite far
in immunizing from subsequent judicial review takeover defense tactics
that are in fact preclusive. Perhaps the court reached the point of sanctioning a 'just say no" defense; perhaps it stopped short. Nevertheless
it seems to have abandoned the effort to subject defensive tactics in
hostile takeovers to serious scrutiny, backing away from several recent
precedents and undermining a sophisticated developing jurisprudence
in the Chancery Court. What accounts for this new judicial stance?52
Three explanations seem plausible: the court decided that takeovers as
51. Paramount Communications, lnc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del.
1989) (citations omitted).
52. Implicit in this question is the assertion that the court's reasoning ought not to
be taken at face value, or as a full explanation of its decision. The text offers particular
objections to some elements of the court's reasoning, but these objections are not so
novel as not to have occurred to the court. The opinion is notable for its formalist
quality. At bottom its reasoning is that under Delaware law the board is responsible for
the business and affairs of the corporation; resisting a takeover relates to a corporation's
business and affairs; therefore, assuming good faith and reasonable investigation, a
court should defer to the board. But, as with most formalist arguments, the reasoning is
hardly complete. Under Delaware law shareholders can freely sell their shares unless
they previously agree otherwise, see Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 202 (1974); shareholders
can remove directors of a non-classified board without cause, see id. § 141(k); shareholders can also vote to replace directors at the annual meeting, see id.§ 141(d). These
elements of Delaware law could generate a different set of rules about takeover defense
tactics, in the same way that the courtjustified deviation from the formalist rule of ratable shareholder payout on the grounds that the law "must grow and develop in response
to ... evolving concepts and needs," Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957. The Paramount opinion is
notably opaque as to why it endorsed a particular view of the board's role, and why that
view has shifted in favor of unreviewable board prerogative.
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an economic matter disserved shareholders or perhaps a larger set of
corporate claimants; the court feared that Delaware's permissive takeover regime would jeopardize its primacy as a state of incorporation; or
the court responded from concern that the takeover phenomenon
threatened important elements of the social fabric.
B.

The Economic Stories

One possible explanation for Paramount's greater deference toward
a board's takeover defense tactics is that the Delaware Supreme Court
came to believe that hostile takeovers were economically undesirable
for groups that the court should protect. There are three different versions of this economic account: first, takeovers have been economically
undesirable· for shareholders, the customary focus of the court's concerns; second, the gains from takeovers came from wrongful transfers
from other groups connected to the corporation, such as bondholders
and employees; and third, takeovers and their externalities produced
net losses for the economy overall. All three economic stories seem
implausible for two reasons. First, the empirical evidence contradicts
the claim that takeovers have net negative effects, especially for groups
the court is most likely to protect. Second, the court is likely to regard
complicated effects, like takeover-related job loss and the general economic impact of takeovers, as beyond its capacity to assess.
I. Protection of Shareholder Interests. - Did the court adopt a stiffer
antitakeover regime for the economic benefit of shareholders? The
opinion itself offers contradictory evidence on this question. The
court's account of the allegedly superior synergies of a Time Warner
versus a Time Paramount combination and the claim that the
Paramount offer could mislead Time shareholders suggest that the
court did buy the thesis that shareholders can be induced to sell at too
cheap a price, especially from the long-run perspective.53 Perhaps the
court decided that a more protective antitakeover regime could prevent
this harm to shareholder interests. On the other hand, the opinion
steers away from any comparison of the value of the relative benefits to
shareholders of the Paramount proposal and the Time Warner combination,54 and from any analysis of the cost of converting the original
merger to a takeover. 55 In fact, t}:le Supreme Court sharply rebuked the
53. See also Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1150 n.12 (endorsing view that directors may
permissibly conclude that target shares are underpriced by the market).
54. In order for the long run value of the Time Warner combination for Time
shareholders to exceed Paramount's offer, Time Warner stock price would have to increase at an extraordinary annual rate: assuming a five year period, growth would have
to exceed a compounded 20% annual rate of return. See Gregg A. Jarrell, The
Paramount Import of Becoming Time-Warner, Wall St.J.,July 13, 1989, at Al4 (editorial column).
55. The original merger implicitly valued Warner at $50 per share, or $9 billion for
the company, based on the .465 exchange ratio. The tender offer valued Warner stock
at $70 per share, or $14 billion for the company. See id.
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Chancery Court for its efforts at comparative calculations, declaring
them beyond the scope ofjudicial competence. It seems unlikely that a
court would wear blinders against examination of the economics of a
particular transaction and then announce a rule premised on empirical
facts about shareholder economic welfare in such transactions
generally.
Moreover, empirical evidence available to the court overwhelmingly shows that shareholders make out exceedingly well in takeovers,
that shareholders of firms that successfully rebuff a hostile bid lose out
on average, and that shareholders suffer significant losses when states
adopt more protective antitakeover regimes. Economic studies uniformly show that target shareholders realize large premiums over prevailing market prices-on the order of fifty percent during the 1980s.56
The results for bidder shareholders are more equivocal, with recent
studies suggesting that bidders on average come out about even, or
possibly suffer small losses.57 But evidence from matched-pair studies
of bidders and targets in particular transactions shows substantial total
gains, meaning that the combined shareholder gains are real but are
disproportionately appropriated by the target.58 This is not surprising
in light of the highly competitive market for targets that emerged during the 1980s. Thus, had the court considered shareholder welfare in
economic terms, it would not have adopted a more stringent antitakeover rule.
Despite this evidence of large shareholder gains, especially for
targets, some have nevertheless argued that target shareholders sell at
too low a price in hostile takeovers. 59 They claim that stock market
prices do not necessarily reflect intrinsic share values, thus permitting
bidders to buy targets at undervalued prices.60 This argument implies
that target shareholders will eventually realize higher share prices as
56. See Bernard Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 597,
601 (1989) (recent comprehensive survey); see also Gregg A.Jarrell et al., The Market
for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 49, 52
( 1988) (estimate of takeover premiums of up to 53.2% may even underestimate actual
premiums because they do not account for price reactions before the formal takeover
offer).
57. See Black, supra note 56, at 602.
58. See Black, supra note 56, at 602; Michael Bradley et al., Synergistic Gains from
Corporate Acquisitions and Their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1988).
59. For discussion and critique of one of the best-known such arguments, a study
by Kidder, Peabody & Co., see Frank H. Easterbrook & Gregg A. Jarrell, Do Targets
Gain from Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 277 (1984).
60. Professor Stout has a more complicated argument: that the assumption of a
downward sloping demand curve for stocks suggests the existence of shareholders who
value the stock at more than the takeover price and who are unwilling sellers in a takeover. See Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair
Value, and Corporate Law, 99 Yale LJ. 1235, 1269-75 (1990).
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the market comes to recognize the true value of the firm. 61 The evidence, however, points in the opposite direction: on average, the stock
price of a firm that successfully thwarts a bid will not recover to the bid
price, on a market-adjusted basis. 62 In other words, if a bid is defeated,
shareholders lose, and lose permanently. A successful takeover defense does not protect shareholders on average. 63
Shareholders also suffer losses when states adopt antitakeover legislation with significant bite or when firms adopt potent antitakeover
measures. Recent studies that look across the spectrum of state laws64
or that focus on particular state laws 65 generally conclude that, on average, state antitakeover measures reduce shareholder wealth. Many
have argued that certain firm-specific antitakeover measures, especially
charter amendments adopted by shareholder vote, might well serve
shareholder interests by enabling the board to bargain on behalf of
shareholders for the best deal from the bidder; but evidence in support
of this proposition is at best equivocal.66 For potent antitakeover devices, such as dual class common stock or flip-in poison pills, the evidence clearly demonstrates adverse effects for shareholders on
average. 67
In short, the amount of evidence showing shareholder gains from
61. The assertion that tendering shareholders are settling for "short-run" wealth
maximization rather than "long-run" gain amounts to this sort of claim. The Delaware
Supreme Court opinion in Paramount rejects this distinction. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
62. See Black, supra note 56, at 607-08; Jarrell et al., supra note 56, at 55; John
Pound, The Information Effects of Takeover Bids and Resistance, 22 J. Fin. Econ. 207,
226 (1988). The reference to market adjustments means that the target's post-bid stock
price is adjusted for general market movements that do not reflect firm specific
performance.
63. To say that "on average" shareholders are made worse off by successful defense of course obscures the fact that in some instances shareholders might do better.
Conceivably, the court is not purporting to announce a rule that works "on average" but
wants to sort desirable defenses from undesirable ones. Nothing in the opinion suggests an effort to separate the sheep from the goats, however, and the Supreme Court
reproves the Chancery Court for even beginning the quantitative analysis necessary for
such a sorting process. For the difficulties involved in fashioning a legal rule for defensive tactics that distinguishes among occasions of shareholder benefit or harm, see
Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics: A Comment on
Two Models, 96 Yale LJ. 295, 319-20 (1986).
64. See Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of SecondGeneration State Takeover Legislation, 25 J. Fin. Econ. 291 (1989).
65. See studies collected inJeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1549, 1571 n.73 (1989); Michael Ryngaert &Jeffry Netter,
Shareholder Wealth Effects of the 1986 Ohio Antitakeover Law Revisited: Its Real Effects, 6J.L. Econ. & Org. 253, 259-61 (1990). But see Donald G. Margotta et al., An
Analysis of the Stock Price Effect of the 1986 Ohio Takeover Legislation, 6 J.L. Econ. &
Org. 235, 241-45 (1990).
66. See Jarrell et al., supra note 56, at 58-61.
67. See id. at 60-61, 63-64;Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 33-36 (1988).
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takeovers and losses from the thwarting of takeovers._ makes it unlikely
that a rational court acting to protect shareholders' economic interests
would have announced a restrictive takeover regime. 68
2. Preventing Wrongful Wealth Transfers.
a. From Bondholders. - Another version of the economic story focuses on wealth transfers to shareholders from bondholders and other
financial claimants that are alleged to result from hostile leveraged
transactions and defensive leveraged recapitalizations. In this version,
the Supreme Court's motivation could have been several fold: it
sought to protect bondholders; it believed that the transfers exceeded
takeover gains in an least some marginal cases; or it believed potential
transfers raised the cost of capital to other firms. Is Paramount a product of these concerns?
Prior takeover cases of the Delaware Supreme Court express no
great concern about transfers from bondholders or other financial
claimants or any concern about any possible spillover effects on corporate finance. In fact, the court in Revlon explicitly rejected the board's
effort to protect debt claimants in the midst of a contested takeover on
the ground that the effort was not rationally related to shareholder interests. 69 To be sure, the court reiterated in Paramount, as it had stated
four years earlier in Unocal, that the board can attend to "other constituencies," including bondholders, in evaluating the threat posed by a
hostile offer. But nothing in Paramount suggests any change in the wellestablished understanding that in Delaware, shareholder interests come
first. 70 Moreover, the court's decision probably harmed rather than
protected bondholder interests. The Time Warner transaction that the
court upheld entailed several billion dollars of additional debt for
Time, which would have depressed the value of outstanding Time debt,
68. This of course assumes that such a court would be aware of such evidence and
regard it as credible. The empirical literature relies heavily on event study methodology, in which shareholder gains and losses are reflected in stock price changes (corrected for broad market movements) over a relatively short period of time. The validity
of that measure of shareholder welfare depends on a belief in market efficiency, including ultimately the view that stock prices reflect "real" economic variables such as output
and profits. The argument that markets are not necessarily efficient, see, e.g.,Jelfrey N.
Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities
Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761, 796-810 (1985), calls into question the reliability of
the stock price studies. Nevertheless, the gains to selling shareholders are so large and
so pervasive as to beggar the concern about target shareholder welfare. Even serious
market efficiency and takeover skeptics seem unmoved by the fate of target shareholders. See, e.g., Louis Lowenstein, Stockholders, Humbug! Giving Them Top Dollar
Could Cheat Us All, Wash. Post,Jan. 14, 1990, at Bl.
69. See Revlon, Inc. v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182-84
(Del. 1986) (rejecting lockup fee paid to one bidder in a contested takeover who offered
extra-contractual protection to debt claimants against a loss in the value of their debt).
70. The Supreme Court had also recently reaffirmed the Delaware rule that bondholders are contractual claimants only and are not owed fiduciary duties. See Simons v.
Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988).
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whereas the Paramount bid would have entailed no new debt for Time
and much less debt overall.
Nor does the empirical evidence bear out the claim that a significant portion of the gain for target shareholders derives from bondholder transfers. Early studies of the effects on bondholders of
increases in a firm's leverage generally failed to show any adverse impact.71 Later studies do show some wealth transfers away from bondholders, but none approaching shareholder gains in magnitude. For
example, in examining a sample of forty-seven leveraged buyouts in the
1980-88 period, Asquith and Wizman found an average reduction of
bondholder wealth of approximately three percent.72 For a sample of
sixteen leveraged buyouts in the 1985-89 period, when many larger
transactions occurred, Warga and Welch found similar results. 78 In
light of the much larger (in percentage terms) average shareholder gain
and the much smaller (in absolute dollar terms) bondholder stake prior
to the leveraging event, bondholder losses, if any, could not be a significant source of shareholder gains even for highly leveraged transactions. 74 Even if the court found such transfers objectionable, a
proportionate response would have focused on compensating bondholders rather than preventing advantageous transactions from
occurring.
In other words, takeovers were not fueled by bondholder losses.
But even if there were some transfers from bondholders ex post, this
71. See Laurentius Marais et al., Wealth Effects of Going Private for Senior Securities, 23 J. Fin. Econ. 155, 158-59 (1989).
72. Paul Asquith & Thierry Wizman, Event Risk, Covenants, and Bondholder
Returns in Leveraged Buyouts, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 195, 203, 207 (1990). The wealth effects
are very sensitive to covenant protection. Where covenant protection is strong, bondholders register small gains on average (approximately 2%), reflecting redemptions and
buyouts of the bonds in the course of the transaction. Where covenant protection is
weak, bondholders register small losses on average (approximately 2%): where it is nonexistent, bondholders lose more on average (approximately 5%). See id. at 203.
73. See Arthur Warga & Ivo Welch, Bondholder Losses in Leveraged Buyouts 12
(November 1991) (mimeo, on file with the Columbia Law Review). Warga and Welch
examined all 29 firms in the sample period that underwent leveraged buyouts and that
had publicly traded nonconvertible debt outstanding, but excluded 13 firms because of
data problems. They found risk-adjusted wealth effects of negative 6%. Id. Table 4.
(The risk adjustment is to account for general market movements.)
74. See Marais et al., supra note 71, at 181-82. Warga & Welch, supra note 73,
generate a matched-pair study of equityholder gains and debtholder losses that shows
that on average the absolute gains far exceed the absolute losses ($1.3 billion in gains,
$35 million in losses), and that average risk adjusted gains swamp average risk adjusted
losses ($1 billion in gains, $64 million in losses). Id. at Table 5. In only one of the
transactions in their sample did debtholder losses amount to a substantial portion of the
equity holder gains. See id. Warga and Welch also note that their study sets the outer
bound on debtholder losses, because their calculations assume that all of the leveraged
firm's debt will lose as much as the bondholders, when in fact private debt frequently is
better protected by restrictive covenants and thus will not suffer similar losses. Puttable
debt or short term debt will also not lose much value. See id. at 13.
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does not mean that transfers occurred ex ante. Prevailing law put bondholders at risk for shareholder opportunism and remitted them to the
protection of their bond indentures. Bondholders were free to assert
contract claims, 75 thus receiving compensation for wrongful transfers,
and could otherwise protect themselves through diversifying moves in
the market. 76
b. From Employees. - In another wealth transfer argument, shareholders wrongfully gain at the expense of other groups that have relationships with the corporation, in particular employees and their
communities. That is, takeover gains come from shareholders' opportunistic breach of implicit contracts between the firm and these constituency groups. 77 The Delaware Supreme Court conceivably could be
trying to rein in takeovers to avoid these wrongful transfers.
In some takeovers, some shareholder gains have surely come
through reductions in employment, but data regarding job loss are conflicting. There are anecdotal reports of mass layoffs, 78 but the evidence
shows that most layoffs are of headquarters employees, not plant workers, and that job loss does not account for a large percentage of takeover gains. 79 It is difficult even to trace a causal connection between
takeovers and job loss, much less to determine whether implicit contracts were violated. If much of the impetus for takeovers comes from
fundamental changes in the economic environment, such as an increase
in international competition or a demand shift for a commodity, takeovers at most hasten an inevitable downsizing and may actually preserve jobs that otherwise would eventually be lost. One famous
example illustrates the point. In 1984, Chevron took over Gulf Oil and
consolidated headquarters operations in Los Angeles, closing Gulf's
Pjttsburgh offices and laying off thousands of employees. But Gulf it75. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504,
1516-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
76. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Recapitalizations, Welfarism,
and Contract 4, 14-15 (Dec. 30, 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
77. See Andrei Schleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach ofTrust in Hostile Takeovers, in Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences 33, 38 (Alanj. Auerbach ed.,
1988); Gordon, supra note 67, at 15-20 (on shareholder opportunism).
78. See, e.g., Betsy Morris, RJR, in Long-Awaited Move, to Dismiss About 12% of
Workers at Tobacco Unit, Wall St.J., Aug. 11, 1989, at A3. Other examples are cited in
Alan E. Garfield, Helping the Casualties of Creative Destruction: Corporate Takeovers
and the Politics of Worker Dislocation, 16J. Corp. L. 249, 249-50 n.32 (1991).
79. See, e.g., Frank Lichtenberg & Donald Siegel, The Effect of Takeovers on the
Employment and Wages of Central-Office and Other Personnel, Nat'l Bur. Econ. Res.
Working Paper No. 2895 at 26-29 (Mar. 1989) (employment decline associated with
takeovers occurs in administrative personnel, not at plant level); Sanjai Bhagat et al.,
Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate Specialization, 1990 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1, 32 (layoffs, principally ofwhitecollar employees, amount to 10-20% of average premium; gains come principally significantly from strategic combinations in industry consolidations).
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self had been laying off employees en masse before the threat of takeover, reducing employment from 58,000 in 1981 to 42,700 in 1983.
Exxon, whose,size.made it impervious to takeovers, was laying.off workers at an even greater rate, cutting its work force from 182,000 to
102,000 in the 1981--87 period. 80 Gulf, like Exxon, responded to fundamental changes in the supply and demand for oil, not to simple
shareholder opportunism. The Chevron takeover may have forced
Gulf to adapt more quickly to the new environment for oil producers in
the early 1980s, but the job loss resulted from structural and competitive changes in the industry, rather than from the takeover.
Other industries have also faced large-scale layoffs in recent
years-automobiles and steel. 81 Firm size meant that these industries
were largely immune to takeovers, but they faced world-wide competitive pressure. Similarly, shifts of corporate headquarters from urban
centers to suburbs, or from the northeast to the sunbelt, commonly
made for cost-cutting reasons by firms not under takeover pressure,
surely must outnumber headquarters shifts after a hostile takeover.
The conflicting arguments and evidence on the question of job loss
make a judgment on the economic impact at best a hard case, which the
court is unlikely to want to essay.s2
Even if the court might make this judgment, the Paramount opinion
is silent on the question of whether shareholder gains from employees
(and other constituencies) in the course of takeovers are wrongful. lt
seems unlikely that the Delaware Supreme Court would favor these
other constituencies over shareholders in the event of a direct clash of
interests, particularly given the notable absence of target employees
and headquarters from Delaware and the legislative signal carried
through the absence of a state plant-closing law. Moreover, the
Delaware courts do not regard job loss in particular cases as compensable. The employment at-will doctrine flourishes in Delaware, 83 and
there is no suggestion that employees laid off following a takeover have
a cause of action. 84 ln short, given the difficulty of the empirical ques80. These figures are drawn from Joseph A. Grundfest, Job Loss and Takeovers
11-12 (Mar. 1988) (mimeo, Securities and Exchange Commission, on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
81. For example, USX reduced the work force in its steel operations from 75,000 to
20,000 over the 1983-90 period and cut the number of salaried employees from 30,000
to 5,000. See Thomas F. O'Boyle, Icahn Forces the Issue at USX: Is It Time to Get Out
of Steel?, Wall St.J., Mar. 9, 1990, at 1.
82. For useful discussions, see Marleen O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's
Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69
N.C. L. Rev. 1189 (1991) and Garfield, supra note 78.
83. See Mann v. Cargill Poultry, Inc., No. 88C-AU37, 1990 WL 91102, at *6 (Del.
Super.June 13, 1990); Rizzo v E.I. DuPont Nemours & Co., 1989 WL 135651, at •1
(Del. Super. Oct. 31, 1989) ("Delaware has continuously recognized the doctrine of atwill employment" (citing cases)).
·
84. Compare Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers lnt'l Union v.
Wickes Cos., No. L-06023-88, at 25-27 (NJ. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 1990) (transcript of oral
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tion and the court's likely predisposition, Paramount probably cannot be
explained in terms of a wealth transfer story.
· 3. General Welfare. - The final economic argument is that the
Delaware Supreme Court acted to rein in hostile takeovers on the view
that they disserve the general economic welfare in any of several ways:
they result in lost productivity from business disruption; they put pressure on managers to plan for the short term, which means reduced research and development and other poor decision-making; they create
dangerously leveraged capital structures; and they divert talent from
"real" economic activity to financial reshuffling. These claims are all
controversial, which at least partially explains why the United States
Congress has failed to pass takeover legislation despite many hearings
and legislative proposals in recent years.85 No conclusive empirical evidence resolves any of these claims, although most academics believe
that the available evidence tilts decidedly in favor of takeovers.86 In any
opinion) (finding that employees laid off as result of hostile takeover adequately pled
cause of action under "intentional and/or tortious interference" with a prospective economic relationship) (on file with Columbia Law Review).
85. See, e.g., KKR LBO Study: Fact or Fantasy?, Corp. Control Alen.June 1989, at
1, 8 (discussing study purporting to show beneficial effects from leveraged buyouts and
a critique thereof, leading to "eminent lack of any consensus" about congressional
action).
86. See, e.g., Bhagat et al., supra note 79, at 34 (layoffs, principally of white-collar
employees, amount to 10-20% of average premium; gains come principally from strategic combinations in industry consolidations); Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value, 24 J. Fin. Econ. 217, 250-51
(1989) (showing improved operating results for large management buyouts completed
1980-86); Frank R. Lichtenberg & Donald Siegel, The Effect of Control Changes on the
Productivity of U.S. Manufacturing Plants, Continental Bank]. Applied Corp. Fin., Summer 1989, at 60, 67 (changes in control lead to greater productivity at plant level; no
evidence of reduced research and development); Lichtenberg & Siegel, supra note 79, at
26-29 (employment decline associated with takeovers occurs in administrative personnel, not at plant level); Randall Morck et al., Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 842, 845 (1989) (targets have low "Tobin Q:s" (measure of
efficient asset utilization) relative to other firms in industry and industries with significant hostile activity have low Q:s); Lisa K. Meulbroek et al., Shark Repellents and Managerial Myopia: An Empirical Test, 98]. Pol. Econ. 1108, 1114-16 (1990) (firms reduce
R&D after adoption of shark repellent amendments, that is, after reduction of takeover
pressure). But see Diana L. Fortier, Hostile Takeovers and the Market for Corporate
Control, Econ. Persp., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 2, 10-12 (empirical data does not establish
efficiency gains); Murray Weidenbaum & Stephen Vogt, Takeovers and Stockholders:
Winners and Losers, Cal. Mgmt. Rev., Summer 1987, at 157, 162 (arguing that empirical
data show no aggregate wealth gain resulting from takeovers since losses to shareholders of acquiring firms tend to offset gains by shareholders of target firms). For a useful
recent summary of the empirical evidence, see Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers:
Theory, Evidence and Regulation (Yale Law School Working Paper No. 138, Apr. 1991).
Whether the Delaware Supreme Court was aware of the evidence that persuades
academics and regarded it as credible is unknown. Conceivably the court had absorbed
particular other "facts" about the world that it regarded as persuasive. As has been
often remarked, for lawyers the plural of anecdote is data.
Many of the highly-leveraged transactions occurring in the late 1980s were not sue-
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event, it seems highly unlikely that the Delaware Court, which regarded
the evaluation of a single transaction as beyond judicial competence,
would take a stand on this broadest and most difficult public policy
question.
In sum, with regard to the economic interests that the Delaware
Supreme Court is most likely to want to protect-shareholder interests-the empirical evidence strongly favors hostile takeovers; a desire
to protect shareholders is therefore an unlikely explanation for the
court's decision to make takeovers more difficult. When the interests of
other financial claimants on the firm are considered, the evidence still
shows net gains from takeovers; if the court sought to resolve distributional questions, it could surely have found a judicial remedy short of
stymieing otherwise desirable transactions. As the range of possible interests the court might wish to protect broadens, the empirical evidence
becomes more controversial; but this is precisely the area in which the
Delaware Courts are least likely to presume the economic judgment on
which to base a far-reaching decision. Thus, it seems that these "economic stories" do not explain the Paramount decision; rather, its source
must be found elsewhere.
cessful and resulted in bankruptcy or reorganization. These costs can at least partially
be attributed to the court-adopted rules that elicit "last dollar auctions," that is, an auction process so structured as to extract the highest possible bid. See, e.g., CRTF Corp.
v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 441-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 180-83 (Del. 1986). Such auctions
are especially vulnerable to the "winner's curse," an empirically identified phenomenon
of certain auctions in which the high bidder overestimates the value of the firm. Winner's curse problems are especially acute in the case of "common value" auctions, in
which competing bidders have identical bases for valuing the firm, rather than varying
bases that reflect special synergies. See Black, supra note 56, at 625-26; Peter Cramton
& Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation, 7 J.L. Econ. &
Org. 27, 33-38 (1991).
Thus, well-diversified shareholders, such as institutional shareholders, would probably prefer rules that did not focus so intently on maximizing the bid price. Such shareholders would of course prefer assets to come under the control of the management
group that could maximize returns, and bids carry information about management's beliefs in that regard. But these shareholders also want to avoid financial structures that
significantly increase expected bankruptcy costs. For diversified investors, the last dollar
comes out of one pocket and goes into another, if the successful bidder and the target
are both public companies; but the trip may entail the creation of a rickety financial
structure that disserves the shareholder interest. Thus, shareholders might well have
rejected some of the auction-focused legal rules adopted by courts, in particular, use of
the poison pill to increase bids. See, e.g., CRTF Corp., 683 F. Supp. at 439. This is
another reason to dispute the wisdom of the Delaware courts' blanket authorization for
board adoption of poison pills without shareholder vote.
Thus, there is no little irony in the possibility of the Delaware Supreme Court's
rejecting hostile bids on general welfare grounds. Having established rules which effectively maximize financial pressure from takeovers, increasing pressure to downsize even
when the firm does not face bankruptcy-the court now decides that "takeovers" are the
problem.
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C. Public Choice Stories
Public choice analysis generally asserts that actors in the political
process, like actors in the marketplace, behave in self-interested ways.87
The legislative process is a market in which interest groups demand
legislation to maximize their own welfare and legislators supply legislation in accordance with a political cost-benefit analysis: legislators will
supply the law that an interest group demands if the political support
derived from supplying the law outweighs the loss of political support
from those on whom the law's burden falls. Thus cohesive minorities,
which can cheaply overcome the obstacles to political organization, frequently will be able to obtain laws that impose costs on diffuse majorities.88 Under the public choice account judges, like legislators, are
heavily influenced by self-interest and their decisions reflect this
influence.
A public choice account of corporate law must accommodate an
important additional factor: the object of regulation, the corporation,
can change its legal domicile at a relatively low cost.89 This ability to
change domicile has two consequences. First, states will compete to
offer corporate law regimes that corporations find attractive,90 seeking
in exchange the direct benefits of franchise tax payments and the indirect benefits of the corporations' hiring oflocal specialists in the state's
law. 91 Second, once a corporation has made its initial location decision, states will be unable to impose additional costs on corporations
87. See generally Geoffrey Brennan &James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 Va. L. Rev. 179, 181 (1988) ("although we do
not believe that narrow self-interest is the sole motive of political agents ... we certainly
believe it to be a significant motive").
88. For a good introduction to the public choice approach, see Symposium on the
Theory of Public Choice, at 74 Va. L. Rev. 167 (1988).
89. A corporation can establish its legal domicile independent of the location of its
headquarters or operations; a state cannot exclude a corporation from activity within the
state because it is a "foreign" corporation. See Harry G. Henn &John R. Alexander,
Laws of Corporations § 89, at 170-71 (3d ed. 1983). A corporation that wishes to
change its domicile can establish a new corporation in the destination state and then
through a merger or sale of assets eliminate the original corporation. A recent survey of
such actions reports that direct costs vary from a few thousand dollars to $1 million, with
typical costs of around $40,000. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces
of the Incorporation Puzzle, lJ.L. Econ. & Org. 225,246 (1985). Among these costs are
legal fees (the most significant cost element), the printing and mailing of proxy statements to shareholders, and various state filing fees. See id. See also Bernard S. Black, Is
Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. L. Rev. 542, 585-89
(1990) (estimating reincorporation costs).
90. These regimes consist of the statutory and decisional law, the judicial infrastructure that interprets and applies the law, and the legislative attitude toward modifying the law in response to subsequent needs.
91. The most illuminating article on the state competition is Romano, supra note
89. Professor Romano develops an elegant argument that Delaware's reliance on
franchise tax revenues, which amount to approximately 17 % of the state's general revenues, precommits the state to modernize its law as necessary and to maintain its focus on
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greater than the. penefits their legal regimes provide plus the cost of
relocation. Prevailing legal regimes give managers and shareholders
exclusive control· o.ver the corporation location decision. 92 Thus when
the state actor assesses the costs and benefits to the "corporation" of a
particular action, the assessment will reflect solely the welfare of these
two parties,93 as opposed to other corporate constituencies such as employees or communities.94
Public choice theory thus provides a second explanation for
Paramount: the decision emerged as a product of self-interested calculations by Delaware lawmakers. The theory must address two questions:
first, assuming that the Delaware Supreme Court is a faithful agent of
the legislature, why the legislature would want the change; second, assuming the court acts in an independently self-interested way, why the
court would want the change.
1. Demand from In-State Managers. - Under the simplest public
choice account, the Delaware Supreme Court acceded to the demands
for new law from managers of Delaware corporations, who felt increasingly threatened by the intensity of a takeover movement that could
engulf even the largest companies, as the RJR transaction showed. Because the managers could credibly threaten to cause corporations to
reincorporate in a state with a protective antitakeover statute, the court
supplied Paramount to preserve the various direct and indirect benefits
that corporate domiciliaries provide to Delaware. Under this theory,
even though benefits to managers are small in comparison to takeover
premiums denied to shareholders, management's concentrated power
prevails over diffuse shareholder interests.
The evi~ence that managers felt threatened by takeovers and in
turn threatened to leave Delaware seems plain enough. Many corporate managers were extremely discomfited by the Chancery Court opinions in Interco and Pillsbury and tried to bring pressure on Delaware to
alter course. In a client memo immediately after the Pillsbury decision,
Martin Lipton, a ri,oted takeover defense attorney, railed against the decision, claiming that it "sentenced Pillsbury to death as an independent
corporate welfare; in tum, this bond encourages corporations to locate in Delaware. See
id. at 235-36, 240-41.
92. See Model Business Corp. Act§§ 11.01, 12.02, and official cmts. (describing
state statutes). The action requires a two-step approval process: first, a board of directors resolution; second, majority shareholder vote.
93. The state competition literature debates mainly whether the shaping force of
corporate law is shareholder welfare, so that competition produces a "race to the top,"
or is managerial welfare, which produces a "race to the bottom." A combination of
forces might produce a "race to the, middle." See Romano, supra note 89, at 227-32.
See generally Black, supra note 89 (race is over; most state corporate law is "trivial").
94. In responding to an overall calculus of political advantage, legislatures may
adopt laws that benefit these other corporate constituencies, as in the case of many state
takeover statutes, but if these statutes impose significant costs on the joint welfare of
shareholders and managers, the corporations may exit.
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company" and "confirms the fear that the Delaware judges have abandoned the Business Judgment Rule in takeover cases." After summarizing the "disastrous" effect of the decision "for American business
and the American economy," Lipton got to the bottom line: "Unless
Delaware acts quickly to correct the Pillsbury decision, the only avenues
open to the half of major American companies incorporated in
Delaware will be federal legislation . . . or leaving Delaware for a more
hospitable state of incorporation."95 One could not go to a practitioners'
mergers and acquisition conference in the winter and spring of
1988-89 without hearing similar expressions of dismay and the threat
to move to more hospitable corporate domiciles.
Nevertheless, the threat of large scale corporate out-migration
from Delaware was not credible and thus should not have precipitated
Paramount for two reasons. First, reincorporation, typically effected
through a merger, requires the affirmative vote of a majority of the outstanding stock.96 Most shareholders would become aware of the reason for the proposed reincorporation and the likely substantial negative
effects of relocation on shareholder welfare.?? This knowledge would
come through disclosures in the proxy statement and through general
market information. Such reincorporation proposals would therefore
fail in most cases. Second, if management could obtain shareholder
approval for reincorporation, it could also obtain shareholder approval
for antitakeover amendments, making reincorporation unnecessary.
Despite the widescale adoption of antitakeover charter amendments in the 1970s and early 1980s, it does not follow ·that reincorporation proposals could have succeeded in the late 1980s. When the
takeover movement first heated up, proposals for staggered boards and
supermajority requirements were commonly approved. 98 Although
subsequent stock price studies showed negative shareholder returns on
average,99 at least some amendments provided benefits for some com95. You Can't Say No in Delaware No More, Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz to clients (Dec. 17, 1988) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (emphasis added). Lipton sounded a similar note about the Jnterco decision:
If it is not reversed by the Delaware Supreme Court, it will be- a dagger aimed at
the hearts of all Delaware corporations and a further fueling of the takeover
frenzy. The Jnterco case and the failure of Delaware to enact an effective takeover statute, raise a very serious question as to Delaware incorporation. New
Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania, among others, are far more desirable states for
incorporation than Delaware in this takeover era. Perhaps it is time to migrate
out of Delaware.
The Interco Case, Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to clients (Nov.
3, 1988) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
96. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 §§ 251, 252 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
97. See, e.g., Karpoff & Malatesta, supra note 64, at 308-12; Ryngaert & Netter,
supra note 65, at 380-83.
'
98. See Jesse H. Choper et al., Cases and Materials on Corporations 1123-26 (3d
ed. 1989).
99. See James A. Brickley et al., Ownership Structure and Voting on Corporate
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panies. Certain .amendments protected shareholders from coercive
two-tier offers. 100 In other cases, the increased takeover deterrence
might have been balanced by the expected increase in the offer price in
cases in which takeovers did occur.1° 1 Shareholders were passive and
perhaps complaisant, but not irrational. Moreover, the evidence
showed that measures that would impose the greatest cost on shareholders were most likely to engender shareholder opposition and
therefore were least likely to be proposed. 102 Shareholders also
learned from their experience and became more wary of antitakeover
amendment proposals. Such proposals had become far less common
by the end of the 1980s, in large measure because proxy solicitors were
predicting that passage might be difficult. 103 Proposals for
reincorporation to states with highly restrictive antitakeover laws would
impose significant costs and thus would face the greatest opposition. 104
The threat of antitakeover reincorporation was also diminished by
the increasingly large institutional ownership positions in major corporations throughout the 1980s and by the institutions' increased scrutiny
of management proposals that could affect takeover prospects. 105
Antitakeover Amendments, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 267,269 (1988); Gregg A.Jarrell & Annette
B. Poulsen, Shark Repellents and Stock Prices, 19J. Fin. Econ. 127, 141-45 (1987).
100. See Jarrell et al., supra note 56, at 60 (discussing "fair price" amendments).
101. See William J. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark Repellents,
and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 Am. B. Found. Res.J.
341, 373-78 ("Voting rules affect both the average price per share that a bidder must
pay ... [and the probability that] a bidder will pay such a price ...."); Dale A. Oesterle,
Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers: A
Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 53, 64-70 (1985) (defensive provisions
may permit management to act as bargaining agent for shareholders and thus obtain
higher returns).
102. See Brickley et al., supra note 99, at 283;Jarrell & Poulsen, supra note 99, at
137, 148-52 (amendments with greatest negative impact on shareholders are negatively
correlated with institutional holdings and positively correlated with insider holdings).
Although most proposed amendments pass, this is affected by the increasingly sophisticated efforts of firms to assess in advance the prospects of adoption and to avoid proposals or withdraw proposals where adoption seems unlikely. See James E. Heard &
Howard D. Sherman, Conflicts oflnterest in the Proxy Voting System 84 (1987).
103. See Black, supra note 5, at 571 (1990).
104. For example, in the Spring 1990, Pennsylvania adopted a stringent, multipronged antitakeover package that increased management's capacity to reject a hostile
bid and that required an unsuccessful raider to disgorge profits on subsequent resale of
his shares to a higher bidder. The estimate of shareholder losses from the statute ranges
from an average decline in stock prices of 4%, see Stephen L. Nesbitt, The Impact of
"Anti-Takeover" Legislation on Pennsylvania Stock Prices 4 (Aug. 22, 1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review), to an average decline of6.9%,
see Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, PA Law: State Antitakeover Laws and
Stock Prices, Fin. AnalystsJ.,July-Aug. 1990 at 8, 10. By contrast, the loss from dualclass common stock recapitalizations, described infra note 108, which could be adopted
only where public shareholders found themselves in especially unfavorable ownership
positions, is estimated at only 3%. See Gordon, supra note 67, at 36-37.
105. See Black, supra note 5, at 567-74 (increasing extent of institutional ownership of public corporations and activism in shareholder voting); Edward B. Rock, The
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Institutions also began to take an active role in trying to force management to roll back existing takeover defenses, such as the poison pill,
and to build mechanisms for independent shareholder scrutiny, such as
confidential voting. 106 In this environment firms were unlikely to receive significant additional antitakeover protection from their shareholders.107 At most, antitakeover reincorporations would be available
only for a small set of firms with an especially favorable distribution of
share ownership: a high level of insider ownership and a low level of
institutional ownership. 108 This would not constitute a very significant
threat of corporate out-migration.109
The threat of corporate out-migration is also dubious because if
management could obtain shareholder approval for reincorporation,
reincorporation would be unnecessary. The state antitakeover statutes
that followed from the United States Supreme C<;mrt decision in CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. 110 purported to regulate the corporation's internal governance processes 111 in order to fit into the rationale by which
the Court likened the Indiana Control Share Acquisitions statute 112 to
traditional state regnlation of corporate governance. 113 But all such
Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. LJ.
445, 447-49 (1991) (same).
106. See Rock, supra note 105, at 481-90.
107. As Martin Lipton recently wrote in a client memo: "If a company does not
have a staggered board and has significant institutional shareholdings, the odds are
against being able to get one." Takeovers Today, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
Memorandum to clients 2 (April 27, 1990) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
108. This is demonstrated by the mid-1980s phenomenon of "dual class common
recapitalizations," in which a limited group of firms obtained shareholder approval to
create two classes of common stock. One class of stock with multiple votes would predictably be held by the insiders, so that the net effect was to increase insider voting
power to the detriment of public shareholders. See generally Gordon, supra note 67, at
10 (discussing negative impact such recapitalizations have on shareholder wealth and
considering possible regulatory responses). These recapitalizations, which imposed significant losses on public shareholders took place almost exclusively in firms with very
significant insider blocks, over 20%, and small institutional positions. See id. at 36-37.
This is because other firms obviously calculated that otherwise shareholders would reject such proposals.
109. The prior wave of dual class recapitalizations should also have reduced the
number of firms needing strong takeover protection that could hope to obtain shareholder approval of the reincorporation.
110. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
111. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203 (1983 & Supp. 1991) (limiting follow-up
merger by new controlling shareholder without approval of prior board); N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 505(a)(2) (Consol. Supp. 1990) (expanding scope of directors' fiduciary
duty). By contrast, the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 121 1/2, ,r,r
137.51-137.70 (Smith-Hurd 1979) (repealed 1983), struck down in Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), entailed a review process by the secretary of state.
112. Ind. Code Ann. §§ 23-1-42-1 to 23-1-42-11 (Bums 1989).
113. The Court compared the Indiana statute, which required disinterested shareholders to approve voting rights for a new controlling shareholder, to traditional state
corporate governance regulation that also could affect mergers: for example, the State's
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internal governance procedures could be added to the corporation's
charter with shareholder consent. Managers pressed for state adoption
of antitakeover statutes precisely because they could not obtain comparable measures from shareholders'.
2. Demand From Out-of State Managers. - A second public choice
story describes the Paramount decision as a response to a credible threat
from a different set of managers and firms: the firms domiciled outside
of Delaware that may be contemplating a relocation, or start-up firms
that have to pick an initial domicile. In order to keep the same absolute
number of firms, Delaware constantly must attract new entrants to offset losses from combinations and business failures. Not only does each
additional incorporating firm pay franchise taxes and provide indirect
benefits, but Delaware's preeminence in the market for incorporations
may also depend on market share in percentage terms. The greater
Delaware's market share, the greater the percentage of corporate law
precedents under Delaware law. This increases lawyers' willingness to
make human capital investment in Delaware law and also enhances the
comparative certainty of Delaware legal rules, which facilitates transaction planning. All of these may be significant factors in protecting
Delaware's competitive position. I 14
Demand from out-of-state managers may be a more serious concern of Delaware lawmakers than threats of departure from in-state
managers. Managements of potentially in-migrating firms have more
discretion over the decision to locate in Delaware than do managements of potentially out-migrating firms. A firm cannot move to
Delaware without management consent. In the case of a firm already
incorporated elsewhere, the board must approve the reincorporating
transaction prior to a shareholder vote.1 15 In the case of a start-up,
management makes the domicile decision in the first instance. In analyzing the credibility of management's threats not to locate in Delaware,
it will be useful to consider the two cases separately.
For most start-ups, the positions of management and shareholders
overlap. In subsequent sales of equity to public shareholders, the original manager/shareholder will bear the cost of whatever governance arrangements are adopted, whether they appear in the charter or in the
law of the state of incorporation. 116 Since the manager/shareholder is
free to add antitakeover provisions to the original charter but will bear
the cost, he should be indifferent to Delaware law in this regard. 11 7
imposition of supermajority voting requirements and dissenters' appraisal rights. See
CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 90-91.
114. See Romano, supra note 89, at 273-78.
115. See supra note 92.
116. See Michael C.Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 325 (1976).
This assumes relatively efficient markets for initial public offerings. See Gordon, supra
note 65, at 1556-64.
117. Conceivably, the manager/shareholder may prefer to rely on a stringent stan-

1991]

CORPORATIONS AND MARKETS

1963

In the case of the ongoing corporation, the credibility of management's threat is a decreasing function of the managers' forgone benefits
in vetoing a Delaware reincorporation. Firms frequently reincorporate
in Delaware to expand the scope of their operation, whether through
an initial public offering of securities or expanded merger and acquisition activity. 118 In both cases Delaware law will benefit the firm
through its traditional advantages: a well-developed corporate law generally favorable toward management prerogative, a commitment to
modernize the law as necessary, and efficient, expert courts. 119 The
certainty and flexibility of Delaware law may be particularly important
to firms intending to engage in merger and acquisition activity. A
Delaware incorporation may also send a helpful signal to the stock market, particularly the new issues market, that a firm has big-time ambitions. Assuming these benefits will be reflected in the firm's stock
price, management's losses in not moving to Delaware depend on the
value of Delaware incorporation, the manager's stock ownership position, and any other incentive compensation tied to stock prices. For a
firm that would move to facilitate business expansion, management's
foregone benefits may be high, which _would discourage a veto.
Moreover, a firm relocating to Delaware could, like the start-up,
adopt a charter'with the desired level of takeover protection. Assuming
that the provisions are no stiffer than the law of the original state,
shareholders should approve the changes; they obtain the benefits of a
Delaware incorporation and suffer no additional antitakeover losses.
Thus, on balance, a threat from a large number of potential entrants to
avoid Delaware is not credible and would not account for Paramount.
3. More Complicated Stories with Competing Forces. - Public choice
theory regards legislators as maximizers in a world of political costs and
benefits. Delaware legislators face significant pressures not only from
corporate managers but also from other political groups with stakes in
takeover law. 120 A more sophisticated public choice account of
Paramount would try to reflect these competing pressures on the legislature (still assuming that the Supreme Court was the legislature's faithdard form statute and decisional law rather than customized charter terms if he believes
that the law will be updated to protect against novel takeover challenges and that comparable charter amendment would be difficult. But the probabilistic costs of this will still
be borne by the manager/shareholder, not the subsequent purchasers.
These behavioral predictions rely on a rational expectations assumption: since the
manager/shareholder will bear the costs, he will behave accordingly. Most legal rules
are premised on the belief that parties will respond rationally to the incentives such
rules provide, but many actors may nevertheless suffer from what tax policy scholars call
"fiscal illusion": the false belief that costs fall elsewhere.
118. See Romano, supra note 89, at 249-53.
119. For skepticism on the importance of these factors in incorporation decisions,
see Black, supra note 90, at 585-91.
120. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469, 502-09 (1987).
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ful agent). On this account, even some possible deterioration in
Delaware's share of the market for incorporations would not necessarily evoke more stringent takeover legislation. The legislature would respond only if the marginal political costs of some corporate
outmigration exceeded the marginal political benefits of satisfying
countervailing pressures from other groups.
Delaware's political economy differs substantially from the various
states that adopted stringent takeover statutes in the late 1980s.
Delaware faces special pressure from corporate managers because of
the state's uniquely heavy reliance on the corporate franchise tax as a
revenue source. 121 Pressure comes from two directions: on one side
are managers who feared that their firms are potential targets; on the
other are managers of acquirors and managers who might undertake a
management buyout that an environment favorable to acquisitions
would facilitate. In other states, managers might also bring to bear
pressure from "stakeholder" constituencies, in particular headquarter
employees whose jobs would be imperiled by a takeover. 122 By contrast, few Delaware corporations are headquartered in Delaware or
otherwise carry out substantial business activities in the state. This provides Delaware relative immunity from such stakeholder constituency
pressures.
Delaware also faces distinct pressure from its corporate bar. Takeovers bring Delaware lawyers unparalleled prosperity. Since many target corporations are domiciled in Delaware, acquirors and targets
retain Delaware counsel to advise on Delaware legal issues and to participate in the fast-paced litigation in Delaware courts that a hostile bid
often triggered. Takeovers frequently produce shareholder derivative
litigation, which leads to further employment of Delaware counsel. On
the other hand, managers of potential targets undoubtedly express dissatisfaction with hostile takeovers to their Delaware counsel with the
strong hope that their views will be reflected to the legislature.
Finally, Delaware faces pressure resulting from the actions of other
states. As other states passed more draconian antitakeover statutes in
the wake of CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.12s in 1987, Delaware's permissiveness contradicted a national trend. 12 4 The risk was not that Con121. See discussion of reliance on franchise tax, supra note 91.
122. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover
Statutes, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 846, 848-52 (1989) (asserting that the chief purpose of antitakeover laws is to protect nonshareholders whom corporate mergers affect); Gordon,
supra note 65, at 1571 n.72; Markj. Roe, Takeover Politics 27-31 (Center for Law and
Economic Studies, Columbia Univ., Working Paper No. 74, Aug. 1991) (discussing rapid
response of state legislatures in circumstances in which large locally-incorporated employer with substantial in-state operations receives hostile bid). The evidence is that
headquarters employees suffer the only substantial job loss associated with takeovers.
See Lichtenberg & Siegel, supra note 79.
123. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
124. See 42 States Currently Have Anti-takeover Laws, ABA Group Told, 22 Sec.
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gress would be persuaded on macroeconomic grounds by a state
consensus against takeovers. That issue had been debated by Congress
throughout the 1980s to a generally inconclusive result; 125 indeed, the
United States Supreme Court's validation of state regulation of takeovers helped take the issue off the national agenda. 126 Rather, the risk
came from the fact that Delaware's law might be seen as imposing externalities on other states-the alleged layoffs and other disruptive effects of business reorganization-and·· those states might go to
Congress for relief. From a public choice perspective, most state takeover legislation can be seen as serving organized in-state interests at
the expense of diffuse out-of-state shareholders. Delaware's law had
the peculiar effect of imposing costs on out-of-state interests that conceivably could retaliate in the national legislative arena. A federal takeover law would take business from Delaware law firms, could diminish
Delaware's corporate law preeminence, and could harm at least some
corporations domiciled in Delaware.1 27 Thus Delaware would have incentives to avoid such congressional action.
All these forces were in play in 1987 and 1988 when the Delaware
legislature considered various legislative proposals before producing a
carefully crafted takeover statute that purported to accomodate the various pressures. 128 Unlike takeover statutes adopted in other states, the
Delaware statute did not pose enormous obstacles to the consummation of a hostile bid. 129 It seemed to suggest that in cases of overReg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1216 (Aug. 17, 1990); Patrick S. McGum et al., State Takeover

Laws, Investor Responsibility Research Center (Sept. 1989) (compiling 150 antitakeover
statutes adopted in 39 states).
125. See generally Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation
and Public Opinion, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 455, 457 (1988). The only significant congressional action aimed at takeovers was the cutback of certain tax advantages, for example,
the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine which permitted nonrecognition of gain in a
taxable transaction in the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085
(codified in scattered sections of 16, 19, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), and the elimination of
favorable tax treatment of so-called "pay in kind" debt securities, which provided for
interest payments to be made in further indebtedness of the issuer, in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (codified in
scattered sections of 2, 5, 7, 12, 20, 26, 29, 38, and 42 U.S.C.). More extreme tax proposals, such as elimination of interest deductibility on acquisition related debt, have
failed.
126. See Roe, supra note 122, at 27.
127. Obviously Delaware acquirors would be hurt, but insofar as the congressional
legislative process was less likely to produce optimum law than the corporate experts
that shaped the Delaware code, all Delaware corporations might suffer some harm.
128. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1991). See generally Craig B. Smith &
Clark W. Furlow, Guide to the Takeover Law of Delaware 3-16 (BNA Corp. Practice
Series 1988) (providing a history of§ 203 and outlining the various types of takeover
statutes considered by the Delaware legislature); Gordon, supra note 65, at 1573 n.77.
129. See supra note 95. The Delaware statute required a hostile bidder to obtain at
least 85% of the target's stock through its initial bid in order to effect an immediate
follow-up merger with the target. Experienced practitioners felt that the statute would
not significantly interfere with all-cash bids for all of the target's outstanding stock. See,
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whelming shareholder preference for the hostile bid, as reflected by an
85 percent tender, the board should recede. The Chancery Court decision in Pillsbury, 130 which noted that 87 percent of Pillsbury's shareholders had accepted the Grand Met bid, is consistent with this reading
of legislative intent. Yet Paramount, which sharply criticized Pillsbury
while expanding board power to rebuff takeover bids, rejected the statutory balance. The Delaware Supreme Court produced a takeover regime substantially more protective than the legislature's,131
The various public choice stories presented thus far fail to explain
Paramount. First, threats by managers to reincorporate outside
Delaware or initially to choose different domiciles are not credible, at
e.g., Stephen Labaton, A Debate Over the Impact of Delaware Takeover Law, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 1, 1988, at D 1 (noting possibility that law will create incentive for use of allcash bids); see also John S. Jahera, Jr. & William Pugh, State Takeover Legislation, 7 J.
L., Econ. & Org. 410 (1991) (little evidence of harm to shareholders from Delaware law).
130. See Grand Metropolitan, PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1058 (Del. Ch.
1988).
131. One very interesting question is whether the court could in fact produce a
regime substantially at variance with the legislature's, since through its power to amend
the Delaware corporate statute, the legislature always has the last move. In other words,
can one focus on judicial interests only in analyzing how the judiciary will act? The
problem is more complicated still because the shape of Delaware corporate law is the
result of an interaction between the courts, the legislature (which can amend the corporate law only by a two-thirds vote), and the Delaware bar, whose corporate law committee plays a very important gate-keeping function. Although the legislature has the
power to modify a proposed corporate enactment, the bar committee seems to determine whether a proposal gets put on the legislature's agenda. This role has arisen as
part of Delaware's strategy to sustain a credible commitment to maintain a modern and
efficient corporate law. How this works out in the context of antitakeover legislation is
not altogether clear. Following John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6J.L. Econ. & Org. 1 (1990), the preferences of the various actors
as described in the text can be displayed on a one dimensional policy space as follows:
antitakeover protection
more

less
Bar

Legislature

Court (Paramount)

This seems an implausible situation, because presumably the bar could initiate an
amendment process that would result in an outcome more favorable to it than
Paramount; the Delaware Supreme Court, knowing this, would have ruled differently.
Perhaps the bar is concerned (and the court knows of this concern) that majority legislative opinion has shifted in the months between the enactment of section 203 and
Paramount, so that a statutory enactment would move further in the court's direction. (It
is conceivable, but unlikely, that the bar might have believed that the public fallout from
the RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout in early 1989 would have changed the legislature's
calculus of interests that produced section 203.) The bar may also hope that the court
did not mean to take as firm an antitakeover position as might initially seem, or that as
the economic impact of the decision on the bar becomes manifest and as the cries for
reincorporation in other states die down, the Supreme Court will shift toward a more
liberal takeover policy. A statutory enactment may not lend itself to such flexibility.
Foreseeing this, the court may have felt free to act. Alternatively, the court may have
acted out of some deeper impulse than is comprehended by this rational actor public
choice account.
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least for most corporations. Second, the legislature's measure of political costs and benefits would have led to a takeover regime less stringent than Paramount. Assuming that the court is a faithful agent for the
legislature, public choice stories fall short. Now it is time to relax that
assumption.
4. The Court as a Self-Maximizing Agent. - Strict public choice theory would deny that courts sho~~d be regarded as the legislature's faithful agents. Courts have their own peculiar interests that their decisions
will tend to serve. Thus even if the legislature would have tightened
the takeover law to stem the threatened exodus of firms from Delaware,
a public choice explanation of Paramount must explain why the court acted. For example, the standard public choice explanation for the responsiveness of Delaware law to new corporate needs turns on the
legislators' desire to protect franchise tax revenues that amount to approximately seventeen percent of the state's annual revenues. 132 It is
easy to see why legislators and the governor should be sensitive to the
fiscal implications of legislation. The desire for reelection, like a hanging, focuses concentration wonderfully. But Delaware Supreme Court
judges are appointed by the governor with the consent of the state senate for twelve-year terms. 133 They may be removed only for serious
cause and by a specialjudicial court, not the legislature. 134 Developing
a theory that relies upon judges' responsiveness to political pressures
therefore presents something of a puzzle. 13 5
Indeed, the motivation ofjudges generally is a conundrum for theories that regard judges as rational actors trying to maximize personal
utility. 136 Political scientists offer two sources of motivation: political
132. See supra note 91. One recent account suggests that New Jersey could tolerate the massive corporate migration to Delaware resulting from its adoption in 1913 of a
more stringent corporate code only because an increased diversity of New Jersey's tax
base reduced its reliance on the franchise tax. See Christopher Grandy, New Jersey
Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929, 49 J. Econ. Hist. 677, 691-92 (1989);
Christopher Grandy, Tum of the Century Chartermongering: Evidence from New
Jersey, Delaware, New York, and Rhode Island (Working Paper 1988).
133. Del. Const. art. IV, § 3.
134. Id. § 37.
135. Another public choice argument not readily available in Paramount is the desire for judicial promotion, since state supreme court judges are unlikely to materially
enhance their chance for elevation to the United States Supreme Court on the basis of a
decision declarative of the state common law of corporations.
136. Some law and economics theorists have given up on the centrality of judicial
motive as a shaping force of the law. Those who argued for the efficiency of the common law were faced with the twin problems ofjudicial opinions devoid of evidence that
their authors were seeking efficient solutions to legal questions and skepticism about the
capacity of judges to identify efficient solutions even if this were their stated objective.
Thus, it was argued that efficiency resulted from an evolutionary process in which inefficient rules were more likely to be litigated and weeded out than efficient rules. See
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 62
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 52, 64 n.44 (1987) (elaborating on the debate).
Alternatively, in explanations of the judicial role in an interest group theory of gov-
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values and, for lower court judges, the desire not to be overruled. Recent studies of the United States Supreme Court, in which the political
party of the appointing President is taken as an indicator of the political
views of the justices, provide some evidence that judges optimize over
their political values. 137 But such explanations are unlikely to have
much bite in the case of the corporate law decisions of the Delaware
Supreme Court. Under the Delaware Constitution, judicial appointments are divided between the political parties. 138 Furthermore, virtuernment,judicial motive plays a secondary role to the role ofjudicial independence. On
this view, the particular importance of courts is to add stability to the legislative process
by enforcing interest group bargains reflected in statutes. Judicial independence from
immediate shifts in legislative alignments means bargains once struck will not be hastily
undone. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The IndependentJudiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875, 879-87 (1975). This argument has
two problems: first, judicial decisions in fact frequently confound interest group bargains; second, the judges' incentives will be to reject, rather than support, interestgroup bargains that may reduce social wealth. See Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction
Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 Va. L. Rev. 471,496,498 (1988). Further work has tried to show
judicial response to personal pecuniary incentives, finding correlations between the
level of judicial independence, as measured by tenure and removal criteria and willingness to overrule legislation on state substantive due process grounds, and legislative
rewards in the form of higher judicial salaries and greater appropriations for the judicial
branch. See Gary M. Anderson et al., On the Incentives ofJudges to Enforce Legislative
Wealth Transfers, 32J.L. & Econ. 215 (1989). The objection is thatjudicial salaries are
not individually set; thus efforts to coordinate actions that may lead to greater overall
judicial compensation (that is, to support interest group bargains) will collapse in a typical prisoner's dilemma pattern because of individual judicial decisions otherwise. See
Macey, supra, at 497-98.
Recent public choice studies try to establish general connection between judicial
self-interest and judicial decision. In one such study, which examines district court decisions on the constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's guidelines for criminal sentences in federal cases, the author posits that judicial outcome will be affected by
such elements Df personal utility as discretion, workload, peer recognition, and promotional potential. He finds that workload considerations and the desire to agree with peer
judges have significant explanatory value and that the other hypothesized relationships
are at least suggested. See Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional" about the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 183, 190-97
(1991); see also Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence from the
Antitrust Sentencing (lnt'l Rev. of L. & Econ., forthcoming 1991); Harold W. Elder,
Property Rights Structures and Criminal Courts: An Analysis of State Criminal Courts,
7 lnt'l Rev. L. & Econ. 21, 22-23 (1987) (argning that electoral and administrative monitoring of judges have different effects on judicial action).
137. See, e.g., Studies in U.S. Supreme Court Behavior (HaroldJ. Spaeth & Saul
Brenner eds., 1990); HaroldJ. Spaeth, Supreme Court Policy Making: Explanations and
Predictions 109-37 (1979). Other variables that have explanatory weight are political
party, the appointing president, and the geographic region. See, e.g., Robert A. Carp &
C. K. Rowland, Policymaking and Politics in the Federal District Courts (1983) (discussing impact of appointing president and geography on judicial voting patterns); Sheldon
Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 491, 504-05 (1975); Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges'
Decisions, 55 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 843, 845-48 (1961).
138. See Del. Const. art. IV., § 3.
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ally all recent Delaware Supreme Court decisions in major corporate
law cases have been unanimous.139
Another common explanation of judicial responsiveness, made
popular by Professor Cary's famous attack on the laxity of Delaware
law, posits judicial allegiance to the interests of the Delaware bar.1 40
The judges are drawn from the bar's ranks and frequently return to
practice. Professional identification and economic self-interest combine to induce the judiciary to produce a body of corporate law that
maximizes the bar's well-being, even at the expense of shareholders.
Whatever the validity of this hypothesis in other contexts, 141 the circumstances of Paramount seem to belie it. A decision that significantly
strengthens takeover protections will reduce the number of bids, hostile or othenvise, for Delaware targets. This means a significant reduction in lucrative legal work for Delaware firms. Moreover, the sweeping
nature of the Supreme Court opinion frustrates other interests of the
Delaware bar as well. Its criticism of the Chancery Court and endorsement ofjudicial deference to the board's good faith business judgment
will probably eliminate a level of judicial scrutiny and nuance that
would produce uncertainty and complicated litigation in future cases.
Why did the Delaware Supreme Court adopt a new takeover regime in Paramount? In particular, why did the court produce a regime
more protective than the legislature's? The most compelling public
choice story is that the Supreme Court wanted to maximize its prestige,
which it regarded as an increasing function of Delaware's market share
of the incorporation business. As long as no other state grabs a substantial number of important corporations, the Delaware Supreme
Court remains the national supreme court on corporate law. Other
states will continue to follow Delaware law; law school casebooks will
continue to rely heavily on Delaware cases; Delaware judges will be
feted at national lawyers' conferences; their work will be subject to intense scrutiny by practitioners and academics alike. Important cases,
like Paramount, will even make it to television. Delaware Supreme
Courtjustices seem to highly value their present status, 142 and may be
motivated to preserve it.
139. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988);
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Moran v.
Household lnt'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). But see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (3-2
decision).
140. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 Yale LJ. 663, 686-92 (1974).
14 l. See id.; see also Macey & Miller, supra note 120, at 503-06 (outlining a general theory ofinterest-group impact on corporate law, focusing particularly on the bar).
142. See Andrew G.T. Moore, II, State Competition: Panel Response, 8 Cardozo L.
Rev. 779, 782 (1987) ("With the possible exception of the Supreme Court of the United
States, which I mention only out of respect, I doubt that there is a more exciting appellate court on which to serve.").
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The Delaware Supreme Court is situated differently from the legislature in a way that permits it to focus exlusively on maximizing
Delaware's corporate law preeminence. The court is largely free of the
need to contend with competing political forces, to trade off the interests of acquirors, targets, and the bar. Thus if court and legislature
happen to agree on the goal of maximizing the number of incorporations, this agreement results from the operation of different sets of incentives. But court and legislature may disagree; the calculus of
political interests facing the legislature may produce a more permissive
takeover regime, even after factoring in the possible costs of a diminished corporate market share. By contrast, a single-minded Supreme
Court can offer a more stringent takeover regime that reassures potential targets while not leading to the exodus of potential acquirors. For
even if acquirors regard the law as unsatisfactory, they will not benefit
from leaving, because it is the law governing targets that matters in a
takeover. The court will regard targets as the marginal actors.
The court may also be more sensitive than the legislature to a
threat of a federal takeover statute. Although a federal statute might
reduce the number of takeovers, and thus hurt the Delaware bar economically, such a statute would not affect the number of Delaware corporations (except possibly positively) and thus would not reduce
franchise tax collections. By contrast, the federalizing of takeover law,
in whole or in part, would signficantly diminish the importance of the
Delaware Supreme Court. The legislature would suffer some loss, but
the court would lose dramatically.
The prestige explanation gains force from an analysis of a historical episode in which the Supreme Court acted to protect the preeminence of Delaware corporate law-making. As mentioned above,
Professor Cary and others attacked Delaware's laxity in the 1970s. The
real threat of this attack was the call for national incorporation of large
publicly held corporations to assure a minimum standard of shareholder protection. 143 This threat was sharpened by the 1977 United
States Supreme Court decision in Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 144 which
held that the protection of shareholders against alleged mismanagement or fiduciary duty violations was largely a matter of state law, that
is, that the existing federal anti-fraud statutes did not address even
glaring abuses so long as full disclosure had been made. Santa Fe thus
dramatically increased the importance of state fiduciary law, raising the
stakes of alleged laxity in Delaware. Barely six months later in Singer v.
143. See, e.g., Ralph Nader, The Case for Federal Chartering, in Corporate Power
in America 67, 84-90 (Ralph Nader & Mark]. Green eds., 1973); Cary, supra note 140,
at 700-02; Donald E. Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus.
Law. 1125, 1128-46 (1976); Donald E. Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations:
An Introduction, 61 Geo. LJ. 71, 79-84 (1972).
144. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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Magnavox Co., 145 a case that was argued and submitted just before Sante
Fe was decided, the Delaware Supreme Court announced a regime that
sought to heighten minority shareholder protection in a particular
transaction-a freezeout merger-fraught with risks of self-dealing.
The decision, which demonstrated that Delaware could tighten fiduciary standards where appropriate, took some of the steam out of the
national incorporation movement. lt is easy to understand why the
court responded so readily. A federal incorporation statute would have
dramatically diminished the Delaware Supreme Court's importance. 146
Yet in the end I find this public choice explanation unsatisfying.
First, as argued above, the case for large-scale corporate out-migration
from Delaware is weak. Both the difficulty in obtaining shareholder approval for reincorporation and the continuing attractions of Delaware
for new incorporations make it unlikely that Delaware's preeminence in
the corporate market depended on a change in its takeover regime.
Large publicly-held corporations, whose franchise tax assessments are
highest, 147 and whom the state would most want to keep, would have
had the most difficulty moving. 148 Moreover, even if one believes that
courts are susceptible to self-interei;ted motives in their decision-making, Paramount is not the opinion that such a self-interested court would
have written. It goes too far; it cuts back the judicial role. If Paramount
closes down the takeover market, the high profile cases, which bring the
most prestige, will stop. Delaware may remain the preeminent corporate law state, but the stuff of controversy will be much tamer. The
litigation docket will return to disputes over the standards for demand
excusal in shareholder derivative actions. The public choice explanation may carry some weight, but in my opinion, the ultimate answer lies
beyond.

D. A Socio-Historical Story (A Begi,nning)
The third and most intriguing account of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Paramount is the "socio-historical" explanation. On this
145. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
146. To be sure, a national incorporation statute would also have threatened the
livelihood of the Delaware bar, another reason for the Supreme Court's response. See
generally Ronald J. Gilson, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 870-72
(1986) (citing additional sources and providing overview of state law prior to Santa Fe).
147. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 503 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
148. The response to the recently enacted Pennsylvania antitakeover statute is instructive. In response to pressure by institutional investors threatening to divest their
Pennsylvania holdings, the Pennsylvania legislature loosened a rather draconian statute
in important respects and also permitted firms to opt out of its provisions for a limited
time period. By the end of the opt-out period this summer, 75% of the publicly-traded
Fortune 500 companies and 60% of the Standard & Poor's 500 companies incorporated
in Pennsylvania had opted out of one or more of the statutory provisions. See Andrew
Aberre et al., Institutional Influence on Corporate Management: The Pennsylvania Antitakeover Statute (work in progress) (empirical study).
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view, the Delaware Supreme Court responded to a widely-shared social
sense that self-interested, market-oriented behavior had gotten out of
hand in the takeover area, that non-economic values such as loyalty,
community, and cultural continuity deserved protection, even in the
corporate setting, and that the corporation itself could foster these values in the general society. Market-based systems, which unleash the
forces of innovation, competition, and profit-seeking and which permit
firms to fail, inevitably put pressure on these solidaristic values. But
hostile takeovers became a particular threat to these values because of
the unusual scope and rapidity of change that they engendered.
Paramount can be understood as an intervention on behalf of society
against markets. This explanation of the court's action takes its inspiration from Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation, which describes how
efforts to constrain the market system of the 19th century spun out of
control and produced conditions that led to terrible wars in the 20th
century. 149 Relevant to an analysis of the Paramount decision are Polanyi's contention and historical argument that a self-regulating market
economy stresses social relationships in a way that inevitably produces
public regulatory countermeasures in a democracy. 1so
Polanyi's claims that there exists a dialectical relationship between
social needs and economic organization in which the economic system
is pressured to serve people's complex social needs rather than simply
to satisfy material desires and the pursuit of gain. According to Polyani, market systems arise because of the desire of the state to consolidate power 15 1 and the need to organize complex production. 152 The
growth of markets must be matched by appropriate state regulation,
however, lest markets become "self-regulating." In self-regulating
markets, land, labor, and money become commodities, and market
forces directly shape people's lives. 153 Thus a self-regulating market
system will eventually disrupt the "human and natural substance of so149. Polanyi, writing between 1939 and 1943, describes how the inability ofliberals
to reconcile government regulation of the market with political freedoms ultimately led
to the rise of fascism, totalitarianism, and war. See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (1944).
150. The inspiration for looking at Polanyi came from a Columbia Law and Economics Workshop presentation by Louis E. Wolcher, Marriage as a Commodity: "The
Enchantress" and Karl Polanyi's Social Theory (Feb. 20, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
151. See Polanyi, supra note 149, at 65-66.
152. See id. at 75.
153.
To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings
and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society. For the alleged commodity "labor power" cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left
unused, without affecting also the human individual who also happens to be
the bearer of this peculiar commodity . . . . Robbed of the protective covering
of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social
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ciety," 154 particularly, employment and residence patterns and the web
of social relationships that follow from those patterns. As Polanyi puts
it:
In disposing of a man's labor power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral entity "man" attached to that tag. Robbed of the protective
covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish
. . . . Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods
and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, ... the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, the market
administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate business enterprise, for shortages and surfeits of money
would prove as disastrous to business as floods and droughts
in primitive society .155
But governments have responded with regulatory measures
designed to restrain the tendency of markets to become self-regnlating.
In the early modem era, markets were held in check by the mercantilist
system run by the state. 156 More recently, legislatures have adopted
social welfare legislation. For example, the Industrial Revolution in
Great Britain was cabined by a wide range of social welfare measures in
the 19th century. 157 Progressive Era legislation in the United States
arose precisely at the moment that the closing of the frontier, shortfalls
in low cost labor, and the end ofliberal monetary policy created sharp
scarcities, which the self-regnlating market did not adequately address.158 More generally, 19th century social history can be understood in terms of the co-movement of industrial capitalism and the
protective social welfare activity that followed shortly thereafter. 159
Polanyi argues that people value positional goods (social standing
and relative wealth) more than absolute wealth, and that solidaristic values of loyalty, community and cultural continuity are more central to
human society than the pursuit of economic gain. Thus people will recoil against unrestrained individual gain-seeking. He does not specifically analyze the responsive mechanism-he particularly eschews a
class interest analysis-but, describes a general social reaction against
market driven, self-seeking, laissez-faire individualism that expresses itself eventually in the exercise of state power. 160 Moreover, although as
a normative matter he clearly objects to the market system's effects on
exposure; they would die as the victims of acute social dislocation through vice,
perversion, crime, and starvation.
Id. at 73.
154. Id. at 3.
155. Id. at 73.
156. See id. at 65-67, 70-71.
157. See, e.g., id. at 83.
158. See id. at 201-02.
159. See id. at 83.
160. See id. at 141-44.
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the human condition, he is also sensitive to the disruptive effects of
state intervention in the market system.161
Polanyi provides an interesting lens through which to examine the
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Paramount. 162 The takeover
movement has provided at least a partial experience of a self-regulating
market. The takeover movement ultimately has been justified in terms
of its role in the self-regulation of a highly-developed capitalist economy: if we permit managers to make autonomous business decisions
and to expand firms without significant restriction, we need takeovers
to police against managerial abuses and mistakes. The market in corporate control is an essential supplement to product and capital market
constraints because those constraints operate against managers only indirectly, and often only gradually. Thus the takeover market provides
shareholders and society with a mechanism to intervene against managers before the product and capital market penalty from managerial mistake or misconduct is too severe. The defense of abuses in the takeover
movement has followed a similar theme: although particular takeovers,
or takeover practices (perhaps junk bonds), have failed, the cure for
bad transactions is better ones. 163 The consequence of this mode of
self-regulation is that the benchmark measure of a firm's success has
been its financial success as reflected in the stock market. The number
of people employed, the lives they lead, and the fate of their communities have been peripheral. Market-based economies inevitably weed
161.
Protectionism helped to transform competitive markets into monopolistic
ones. . . . Economic adjustment became slow and difficult. The self-regulation
of markets was gravely hampered. Eventually, unadjusted price and cost structures prolonged depressions, unadjusted equipment retarded the liquidation of
unprofitable investments, unadjusted price and income levels caused social
tension.
Id. at 218.
162. Polyani's is not the only possible socio-historical theory that might be offered
to explain Paramount. For example, in Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public Action (1986), the economist Albert Hirschman presents a theory of social change
that argues for a cycling between public participation and private accumulation based on
the disappointment that pursuit of each such activity will inevitably produce. To apply
this to Paramount, a period of unrestrained self-seeking, market-based activity eventually
led to disappointment with the rewards of this activity and thus a tum to public values
reflected in the case. Unlike Polyani, for whom the catalyst is social distress arising from
market-driven activity, for Hirschman the key factor is disappointment by those who are
the prosperous beneficiaries of market activity. Since there is considerable evidence of
social distress associated with takeovers and minimal evidence that those who profited
from takeovers had begun to be disenchanted with affluence, I think Polyani is a better
starting point.
163. See Mark L. Mitchell & Kenneth Lehn, Do Bad Bidders Become Good
Targets?, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 372, 396-97 (1990) (firms making bad acquisitions are more
likely to be taken over); Randall Morck et al., Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?, 45 J. Fin. 31, 47 (1990) (hostile bust-up takeovers undo past
conglomeration).
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out economic failures, but takeovers intensify ~nd ~ccelerate the process in a way that puts pressure on social values.
·
The full implications of a self-regulating market appeared in the
late 1980s in the form of a mounting wave of extraordinary transactions
in which large, well-known companies were either taken over or radically restructured, through unprecedented financial arrangements and
rapid reorganization of the structure of enterpris~. The pace of economic rationalization dramatically increased, whether precipitated by
takeovers or by extrinsic economic factors; selloffs and layoffs replaced
attrition as an adjustment mechanism. Regardless of the actual causal
connection between takeovers and job loss, short-run and long-run, the
occasions of high visibility layoffs, especially of white collar employees,
captured public attention. Managers who could not maximize shareholder values-whether because of managerial inefficiency or unwillinguess to follow consensus· views about business and financial
strategy-faced siguificant risk of ouster by a takeover. The takeover
threat made managerial decisionmaking increasingly subservient to the
market's view of investment, production, and financing choices: the
market diminished the domain of management choice. It was against
this backdrop that Time, Warner, and Paramount battled over whether
managers could devise an expansion strategy insulated from marketplace siguals about the availability of a better strategy (better, at least
for shareholders).
The Delaware Supreme Court decided Paramount amidst a rising
tide of negative press about the takeover movement's adverse impact
on managers and employees and the equally negative implications for
public mores. There was a surge of popular negativism about takeovers
and the high speed money culture that attended the explosion of the
takeover movement in the late 1980s. Movies, books, and the press
suddenly condemned figures whom they had shortly before characterized as financial geniuses and activity they had earlier seen as proof of
capitalism's robustness. The movie Wall Street, which won the Academy
Award for best picture of 1987, provides a paradigmatic example of
how the culture began to reinterpret the takeover movement. The
movie initially offers a flattering portrayal of takeover arbitrageur
"Gordon Gekko": shrewd, energetic, attractive. He is also a philosopher of market capitalism, delivering a homily at a shareholders' meeting about the virtues of greed: "Greed is good." But the movie
reverses field. Gekko manipulates companies and people; he gives
greed a bad name. In the climactic scene, Gekko takes aim at the livelihood of loyal union employees in a planned takeover of a regional airline. Inextricably tied to this move is Gekko's deception of a young
protege, "Bud." After Gekko seduces Bud into a life of insider trading,
he seeks to use Bud against Bud's father, the union head. In delivering
Gekko's comeuppance, the movie draws tight connections between
Gekko's personal corruption and his takeover activity, suggesting the
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latter is just the societal flip side of the former. Bud, the movie's protagonist, rereads the takeover movement within the frame of the movie.
Initially, greed carries him away, but when he sees its destructive effect
on the social fabric-his father and his father's union cohorts-he recoils from it. 164
Other paradigmatic instances of cultural reinterpretation were the
press accounts that followed stories of business triumph with the later
tallying of the human costs of takeovers. A particularly revealing example is the Wall Street Journal's review of the Safeway supermarkets
leveraged buyout transaction. 1 65 The lengthy article acknowledged
that the transaction, which occurred in 1986, powerfully demonstrated
the financial success for shareholders that can accompany a leveraged
buyout. (Indeed, one of the Journal's own columnists wrote a rave for
the Safeway LBO only a few months before the critical account. 166)
Nevertheless the article focused on the number of employees laid off
and, rather sensationally, on the employees or their family members
who had committed suicide or died as a result of layoffs. It was especially startling to see this story in the paper of business record, whose
editorial page had been a consistent cheerleader for the takeover
movement.
The unacceptable level of social distress attributed to takeovers
was also the public theme of widespread state legislative activity at the
time the Delaware Supreme Court decided Paramount. Not only did a
majority of states adopt significant antitakeover legislation, 167 but many
164. Wall Street (Twentieth Century Fox, 1987). Several non-fiction books explore
similar themes. The best-selling Predators' Ball, published in 1988, takes a decidedly
negative view of takeover entrepreneurs and their deals. The players are parvenus and
opportunists plucked from obscurity by crafty monomaniac Michael Milken so that his
firm, Drexel Burnham Lambert, can generate fee-generating takeover activity. The title
comes from the lavish annual reception Drexel sponsored for its clients and other significant industry figures, described as a roman bacchanalia. The merger and acquisition
transactions are all described in terms of ego and conquest, never in terms of economic
substance, and a grim foreboding of the Final Judgment overhangs the scene. See
Connie Bruck, The Predators' Ball (1988). Similarly, Barbarians at the Gate, an account
of the RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout published in 1990, presents a jaundiced view of
virtually all major participants. The book's bete noire is F. Ross Johnson, the CEO who
put RJR Nabisco in play with what turned out to be a low-ball bid, but whom the book
also excoriates for his concern with maximizing shareholder value. In its narration of
the transaction, the book savages many of its protagonists and presents the view that
greed has corrupted people possessing more luck than talent to think of companies as
financial tinkertoys rather than producers of goods and services. See Bryan Burrough &
John Helyar, Barbarians at the Gate (1990).
165. Susan C. Faludi, Safeway LBO Yields Vast Profits But Exacts A Heavy Human
Toll, Wall St.J .• May 16, 1990, at Al. The story appeared after the Paramount opinion
but reflects attitudes and fears that attended the takeover movement from its inception.
This article won a Pulitzer Prize for its author.
166. George Melloan, Safeway's LBO is Three Years Old and Doing Fine, Wall St.
J .• Dec. 5, 1989, at A23.
167. See supra note 124.
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states adopted "constituency statutes" that, at least formally, deviated
from the shareholder primacy, shareholder wealth maximization standard that is the bedrock of corporate law. 168 These statutes articulated
fiduciary duty standards that explicitly permitted directors to consider
the interest of non-shareholder constituency groups in fashioning a response to a hostile bid. 169 When closely examined, most of these statutes seem more managerialist than constituency-oriented, since the
balancing of interests is left to non-reviewable management discretion.170 Nevertheless, regardless of the actual political economy of
state antitakeover statutes, 171 they suppressed hostile bids and were
widely perceived as restraining the self-regulating market. Indeed, the
adverse impact on shareholder welfare from the Paramount decision in
particular, 172 and state antitakeover legislation more generally, 173 supports a socio-historical explanation. As Polanyi points out, state intervention in the self-regulating market will often add frictions and
inefficiencies that are costly and undesirable from an economic
standpoint. 174
168. American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and
Recommendations §§ 2.01, 6.02 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1991).
169. See David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 Ind. L. Rev. 223, 241 n.76,
240-46 (199I) (compiling and describing statutes).
170. Professor Millon's heroic effort to define and defend an appropriate standard
of review shows only the futility of the task. See Millon, supra note 169. The states also
seemed to understand that any serious effort to protect constituencies against management's decision to close a plant, move a headquarters, or lay off workers would precipitate an exodus to Delaware. Nor did the states seriously contemplate corporate
governance changes that would have put constituency representatives in the board
room.
171. Whether these statutes actually are driven by a widely shared belief about the
need to protect society from the rigors of the self-regulating market or by rent-seeking
behavior by corporate managers is controversial. Compare Johnson & Millon, supra
note 122, at 848 (the main goal of state takeover laws is to protect non-shareholders
from harmful impact of restructuring) with Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of
Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 111 (1987) (corporations lobby for antitakeover legislation and are its beneficiaries). The social protection story runs bead on into the political economy of state takeover legislation. Most legislation has been adopted in
response to lobbying by a well organized in-state grou~orporate managers-with
power to direct the flow of campaigu funding, frequently in a crisis mode triggered by a
hostile bid for an in-state firm. The opposition-shareholders-generally are diffuse,
poorly organized, and out-of-state.
172. Paramount's bid was for at least $200; Time's stock price on Friday, November
22, 1991 was $83 per share.
173. See supra notes 156-59.
174. From this point of view the real puzzle might be the move in the United States
Supreme Court from Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), which adopted a restrictive view toward state antitakeover laws, to CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S.
69 (1987), which opened the floodgates. Ever since hostile takeovers became a prominent part of the corporate landscape, states have tried to provide protection for incumbent management. The early statutes tried to regulate takeovers directly, and thus were
easy targets on preemption and commerce clause grounds. Subsequent state statutes
operated through the mechanism of internal corporate governance regulation; the
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The most important evidence of Paramount's provenance is in the
opinion itself. In explaining its decision to allow Time to thwart
Paramount's hostile bid through a virtually preclusive transaction with
Warner, the Delaware Supreme Court focused on the values of continuity, loyalty, and collegial decision-making, rejecting the hegemony
of markets. Each element-die solidaristic values expressed through
the corporation and the subservient role of markets-plays an important role in the decision.
The court rejected the hegemony of the market in two explicit respects. First, in deciding that Time's directors did not incur a Revlon
duty-the duty to obtain the highest immediate share price for the
firm-by undertaking the merger with Warner, the court rejected the
claim that the market should be the ultimate arbiter of the wisdom of
the directors' decision. Time is not "for sale" unless the directors consciously put it up for sale. Not every fundamental transaction is subject
to a market test. 175 Second, in deciding that Time's response to the
Paramount bid satisfied Unocal, the Supreme Court rejected the Chancery Court's efforts to analyze the wisdom of the directors' actions in
economic terms, long term and short term, and to match them against
what the market offered. 176 The Supreme Court made the matter one
of market irrelevancy rather than market efficiency.
Shareholders have no recourse to the market, according to the
Supreme Court, because the directors have statutory power and duty to
manage "[t]he business and affairs of a corporation." 177 This authority
includes "the selection of a time frame for achievement of corporate
goals" 178 and thus selection of the benchmark against which performance should be judged. In an important innovation in this case, the
court conceives of this duty as requiring directors to protect shareholdCourt in CTS seized on this distinction to validate the Indiana statute in question. But
the crucial move in CTS was the denial of the existence of a national market in corporate
control transactions. Because corporations were creatures of the state, said the Court,
the state had the right to decide when shareholder interests were adversely affected and
how to protect them. Thus, notwithstanding localist motives, states could use the corporate law to block takeovers. The question, of course, is why the United States
Supreme Court was moved by such a formalist distinction between direct and indirect
regulation of takeovers; why it rejected the existence of a national market that it once
accepted; and why it permitted this kind oflocalist intervention in such markets. (Interestingly, although CTS spoke solely in terms of the state interest in protecting shareholders, the constitutionality of more explicitly localist constituency statutes seems not
to have been seriously questioned, and in reviewing other kinds of statutes, courts have
not seriously examined the shareholder protection claim.) For more elaborate discussion of CTS from a somewhat different perspective, see Elliott]. Weiss, What Lawyers
Do When the Emperor Has No Clothes: Evaluating CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. ofAmerica
and Its Progeny, Parts I and II, 78 Geo. LJ. 1655, 79 Geo. LJ. 211 (1990).
175. See supra note 45.
176. See text accompanying supra notes 39-42.
177. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § l4l(a) (1983).
178. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154.
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ers from the deceptions of the market. 179 The court implied an almost
seigneurial relation between shareholders and managers: shareholders, having delegated power to managers, cannot revoke that delegation at will. This relation is by no means a necessary entailment in a
corporate law that permits removal of directors at will 180 and seems
inconsistent with the basic claims that underlie free capital markets.
Why did the court preclude the shareholders' recourse to markets?
The answer seems bound up with its efforts to protect solidaristic values, particularly as they occur within the corporation. The opinion discusses at length the fitness of Time's directors, the quality of their
deliberations, and their desire to preserve the "Time Culture," a tradition that separated editorial policy from business concerns. 181
Although the court appears to touch only lightly on non-shareholder
constituencies whose interests might bear on directors' decision-making, 182 in fact those interests resound strongly in the opinion. After all,
what is the "Time Culture" except a way in which employees relate to
one another in the corporate setting so as to serve the broader public
with Time's journalism? The court does not tie Time Culture to an
economic purpose; it suffices as an independent basis for director decision. The court's discussion of Time Culture may play an even broader
role in the analysis. It may represent general social interests that the
court wishes to preserve but cannot directly address in the case, because those interests are not part of traditional corporate law discourse.
The court may believe that hostile takeovers promote legitimate economic interests, but that the cost to important social values is too high;
this it cannot say, except perhaps through its reference to Time
Culture.
Although the court did not explicitly condemn the self-seeking of
Time shareholders who want the takeover price, it does base the legitimacy of the directors' rejection of Paramount's bid on their claim to act
in the corporation's interest, not their own. Time's insiders did not
seek a handsome equity stake in the combined Time Warner 1ss nor
more lucrative employment contracts. 1s 4
The Paramount Court
imagined a corporation possessing a culture, self-generated goals, and
179. See id. at 1153.
180. See Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, § 141(k) (1983). Particularly in light of the "independent statutory ground" doctrine that the court relies upon in other contexts, see,
e.g., Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963), it would be easy to read the
"power and duty to manage" as applying insofar as a person remains a director, but not
conferring power to resist the decision by shareholders to sell to a party who might
remove incumbent directors. See also supra note 52.
181. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1143-49.
182. See id. at 1153.
183. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1273 (Del. 1988)
(senior management of target company to receive 20% ownership in restructured
company).
184. See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1146.
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the capacity to deny self-seeking behavior by shareholders. In other
words, the court allowed the corporation to take actions that make it a
bulwark against the self-regulating market. In contrast to a shareholder
entitlement to sell at the highest price, the court imagined a shareholder commitment to an independent group of decision-makers acting
for the corporation's interests, including the preservation of certain
values.
It is also important to understand the limit of Paramount's claim.
The court's analysis does not change the ends of corporate law. 185 As
a regulatory intervention against a self-regulating market, 186 Paramount
simply changes the way that the market in corporate control operates.
The same goals guide management behavior-shareholder wealth maximization-but now directors are more clearly the arbiters of that standard of success, and they may choose to protect non-market values. 187
Several questions remain in the suggestion that the Delaware
Supreme Court acted in service of a socio-historical impulse in its
Paramount opinion. First, why did the court act, as opposed to the legislature, which in other states had been the responsive mechanism? 188
From the perspective of the socio-historical argument, Delaware's
political economy disabled the legislature from acting. Because few
Delaware corporations have headquarters or employees in Delaware,
Delaware was insulated from much of the social stress associated with
takeovers. Delaware's relatively permissive takeover statute, fashioned
to balance pressures from acquirors and its Bar, imposed an externality
on the rest of the country.
But this explains only legislative inaction, not court action. Why
would courts generally, and the Delaware courts in particular, play this
185. See Millon, supra note 169, at 24-26 (making such a claim for takeover
statutes).
186. Some might object that Paramount's withdrawal of judicial review of defensive
tactics is deregulatory, especially insofar as it takes courts out of the process of shareholder-manager bargaining. See Fred S. McChesney & William]. Carney, Efficient Law
and Efficient Markets: The Time Warner Decision, Regulation (forthcoming 1991). But
this ignores the pervasiveness of existing corporate regnlation. Eliminating one element
of regulation may only increase the importance of other elements, such as the statutory
grant to managers of agenda control. More fundamentally, both "regulation" and "deregnlation" may be forms of "regulation"+-that is, social control-but they have different regulatory effects in context. Deregµlation of the market in corporate control
regulates corporate managerial behavior and regulation of that market deregulates managerial behavior; both are mechanisms of social regulation.
187. Thus Paramount can be read as a restoration ofa traditional form ofmanagerialism, subjected to attack by hostile takeovers, that trusts directors to heed the primacy
of shareholder interests while granting them discretion to address constituency concerns in circumstances they deem appropriate. See infra note 199.
188. Delaware adopted a revised antitakeover statute in early 1988, see Del. Code
Ann., tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1991), that after considerable pulling and hauling emerged in a
form that did not significantly impair shareholder interests. See text accompanying
supra notes 128-29.
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socio-historical role? Certainly in the constitutional realm courts have
become comfortable with the idea that their decisions gain legitimacy
from an emerging social consensus and properly play a role in shaping
that consensus as well as heralding it.1 89 This is a familiar explanation
oflandmark cases such as Brown v. Board of Education, 19 Furman v. Georgia, 191 and Roe v. Wade. 192 Yet, unlike constitutional law, the shaping of
corporate law has seemed a more technical enterprise, removed from
broad social impulses. Nevertheless, important decisions on the purpose of corporate enterprise have responded to the socio-historical moment in important ways. For example, the 1919 case Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., 193 which limited directors' business and dividend decisions to the
service of narrowly defined shareholder interests, is a product of a
number of important factors: the desire to legitimate managerial
power over large scale economic resources through strict accountability
to shareholders, 194 classical conception of the corporation as a profitmaking rather than a quasi-public entity, 195 and perhaps even concern

°

189. See Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 Ohio St. LJ. 223, 228-29 (1981) (compendium of theories); Frank I.
Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, IOO Harv. L. Rev. 5, 74-76 (1986)
(courts as a site of self-governing activity).
190. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
191. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
192. 4IO U.S. 113 (1973). Note also that decisions resting on such claims become
unstable if the Court misidentifies a consensus or the consensus erodes. The undoing of
Funnan and the precarious state of Roe reflect this phenomenon.
193. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). Plaintiff minority shareholders challenged Ford's
policy of limiting dividend payouts, alleging, among other things, that Ford was reinvesting funds to expand the business, rather than paying increased dividends, in order
to "employ still more men; to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest
possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes." 170 N.W. 668, 671
(1919). In requiring a dividend payout, the Michigan Supreme Court stated that "A
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the benefit of the stockholders. . . . The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to
attain that end and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of
profits or to the nondistribution of the profits among stockholders in order to devote
them to other purposes." Id. at 684.
194. See James W. Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law
of the United States, 1780-1970, at 82, 99, !06-07 (1970); Adolph A. Berle, Jr. and
Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 221 (1932); Thorstein Veblen, Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times: 85 (1923);
William W. Cook, A Treatise on Stock and Stockholders and General Corporation Law
§ 664, at 726 (1889).
195. Throughout the 19th century entrepreneurs and reformers following classical
economic theory fought for general incorporation statutes that would permit organization of corporations for wholly private purposes. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise
and American Law 1836-1937, at 11-41 (1991). Nineteenth and early twentieth century
treatises emphasized the exclusively profit-making objectives of the private corporation.
See, e.g.,Joseph K. Angell & Samuel Ames, A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate§ 1, at 28-29 (3d ed. 1846); Charles B. Elliott, A Treatise on the Law of
Private Corporations§ 15 at 16; § 391 at 414 (3d ed. 1900); Victor Morawetz, A Treatise
on the Law of Private Corporations Other than Charitable Corporations § 244, at 235
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about the wisdom of Ford's worker capitalism in the post-Bolshevik
world. 196 A very different consensus about the social obligations of
large economic institutions underpins A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, I 97 a
1953 case which permitted directors to make corporate contributions
for general social welfare purposes. 198 The 1950s were the high tide of
benevolent managerialism 199 that reflected the importance of the corporation to the organization of social life.200
In corporate law matters, the Delaware Supreme Court is obviously
cognizant ofits leading role. That role is enhanced in the takeover area
by the actual impact that Delaware law has on takeover practice, both
through firms that are incorporated there and through the frequently
authoritative influence that Delaware courts have as the expositor of
corporate law norms. In responding to the socio-historical moment,
the Delaware Court in Paramount took the approach of a constitutional
court. Its discourse was corporate law, but the social imperative was
the ghost in the machine.
(1882). Ford's broad conception of corporate purpose would fit with a quasi-public conception of the corporation that the classical conception strongly resisted. Moreover, the
use of profits other than to pay dividends could be seen as abrogation of shareholders'
contractual rights.
196. See, e.g., People v. Ruthenberg, 201 N.W. 358,359 (Mich. 1925) (construing a
1919 Michigan criminal syndicalism statute outlawing advocacy of"crime, sabotage, violence or other unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or
political reform."); William Preston.Jr., Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of
Radicals, 1903-1933, at 88-151, 208-237 (1963) (labor radicalism and suppression
cresting 1915-1921); Stanley Cohen, A Study in Natavism: The American Red Scare of
1919-20, 79 Pol. Sci. Q 52 (1964) (unemployment and other influences in period); Robert K. Murray, Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920, 105-121 (1955)
(organized labor as key actor in concern over domestic radicalism).
197. 98 A.2d 581 (NJ. 1953).
198. See generally American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance
and Structure: Restatement and Recommendations, Reporters Note to § 2.01 (Tent.
Draft No. 11, 1991) (describing historical development of utilization of corporate resources for humanitarian educational, or philanthropic purposes).
199. Managerialism is the argument that increasing management power in order to
balance the interests of various corporate constituency groups-shareholders, workers,
suppliers, communities, etc.-is the best way to maximize social welfare from the corporate form. Compare Adolph A. Berle, Jr., The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution
109-15, 164-88 (1954) (argument for managerialism) with Edward S. Mason, The Apologetics of"Managerialism," 31 J. Bus 1 (1958) (critical view). See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation 24-29 (1976) (historical account).
200. See, e.g. Earl Latham, The Commonwealth of the Corporation, 55 Nw. L. Rev.
25, 29-33 (1960); William Whyte, The Organization Man (1956). A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v.
Barlow puts the matter as follows: "When the wealth of the nation was primarily in the
hands of individuals they discharged their responsibilities as citizens by donating freely
for charitable purposes. With the transfer.of most of the wealth to corporate hands and
the imposition of heavy burdens of individual taxation, they have been unable to keep
pace with increased philanthropic needs. They have therefore, with justification, turned
to corporations to assume the modern burdens of good citizenship in the same manner
as humans do." 98 A.2d 581 at 585-86 (NJ. 1953).
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Choosing Among Theories

All three theories have a certain appeal. The economic account of
Paramount is anchored in a traditional view that the Delaware Supreme
Court was trying its best to protect the customary beneficiaries of corporate law, in particular the shareholders and other constituencies of
the corporation. The public choice account explains Paramount in
terms of a political theory of the court's perception of self-interest, or
perhaps more broadly, the court's response to interests of the legislature. The socio-historical account situates Paramount in a different conception of the court's role, in which the court tries to map the powerful
feelings of an historical moment onto the law. 1 have asserted that the
decision is best explained in terms of a socio-historical impulse that
seeks to restrict the domain of the market in corporate law. This may
be an intriguing theory, but how would one go about proving its explanatory power? The argument fits with a scholarly view that conceives of corporate law as having been constructed, at least historically,
with goals beyond shareholder wealth maximization,2°1 and fits as well
with a normative agenda pointed in a similar direction. In some rough
way, it corresponds to a popular sense that the American history of economic regulation moves in cycles: reformist measures follow periods of
social stress and alleged abuse from unconstrained market activity.
Nevertheless, a socio-historical explanation seems vague, fuzzy, and indeterminate. Can the theory be falsified; can its implications be
tested?2° 2 This theory also can carry normative weight. Assume that
the Delaware Supreme Court wishes to give expression to a socio-his201. Compare, e.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 545 (1933)
(Brandeis, J ., dissenting) (granting corporate privilege is a matter of state policy determined by consideration of public welfare); MortonJ. Horwitz, The Transformation of
American Law, 1780-1860, at 111-14 (1977) (corporation occupied a "twilight zone in
the eyes of the law, sometimes conceived of as a public instrumentality, at other times
regarded as a private entity."); Hurst, supra note 194, at 17 (corporate charter "not only
an official license but also a pattern for organizing certain human relations"); David
Millon, supra note 169, at 905-18 (describing attempts of nineteenth century legislatures to structure corporations in the public interest and to avoid "the potentially destructive effects of corporate economic power on the welfare of the general public");
William H. Simon, Contract versus Politics in Corporation Doctrine, in The Politics of
Law 387, 394-98 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) with Henry N. Butler, NineteenthCentury Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14J. Legal
Stud. 129, 130-33 (1985) (changes in 19th century corporate law were not caused by
interest group politics, but by factors beyond the legislature's control).
202. Note how the interpretation of the Paramount decision interacts with an explanation of that decision. 1f you believe that the court is acting in response to threats of
more favorable (to managers) law from other states, then you should interpret the case
as a legal object guiding future behavior, as giving managers the same level of antitakeover protection as plausible competitor states. If you believe an economic explanation,
or a socio-historical explanation, your legal interpretation of the case changes accord- ,
ingly. Presumably then, an explanation can be tested with respect to predictions about
future cases.
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tori cal impulse that aims to restrict markets. What sort of law of corporate control should emerge?
The theory could imply a different judicial attitude toward proxy
battles than hostile takeovers. The core of the socio-historical account
is the rejection of markets as the ultimate (or at least exclusive) decision-maker over economic resources, in favor of human agency. This
principle fits with a proxy contest, which ultimately entails an appeal to
shareholders about the wisdom of replacing a management team and
changing a course of business action. The decision mechanism for a
proxy battle, unlike a hostile tender offer, is not a marketplace exchange but rather a vote following a process of solicitation and persuasion. To be sure, a tender offer also entails a certain kind of
shareholder persuasion-that the bid price is higher than any price
they are likely to be offered for their shares in the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless there is an important distinction between persuading
shareholders to exercise voice versus exit. This distinction maps onto
the difference between decisions made by continuing participants in the
enterprise, acting in response to multiple variables, as opposed to decisions by impersonal markets reacting to a single, economic variable.
Moreover, proxy battles bring about large-scale change gradually,
whereas hostile tender offers spread like a fever. In a proxy system,
change for a particular firm ordinarily can occur only once a year, at the
annual shareholders meeting. Considerable advance notice and planning are required. In contrast, a tender offer can be made at any time,
in immediate response to particular market conditions and ajudgment
about a particular firm. More generally, the much greater organizational work required in the case of a proxy battle is likely to limit their
of battles. Unlike the hostile takeover, whose use inspired abrupt and
massive changes in the capital structure of many firms, the proxy battle
is unlikely to transform the shape of enterprise in any rapid way. Thus,
insofar as a socio-historical theory is sensitive to the rate of change,
because of the stress from rapid change, legal rules will favor the proxy
battle over a hostile tender offer.203
Thus on the socio-historical theory, the proxy battle should receive
judicial support as a way to police management. If the court is less
protective of incumbents in proxy fights than in takeover battles-if a
heightened business judgment rule emerges and sticks in response to
management defensive tactics in proxy battles-this would support a
socio-historical interpretation of Paramount. By contrast, if what is really driving the court is the concern that managers will flee to more
hospitable regimes, then any displacement mechanism will engender
203. Many of the reformist measures pointed out by Polanyi were designed to slow
the growth of the market economy and the industrial revolution, see, e.g., Polanyi, supra
note 150, at 37, 65, 216.
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judicial hostility. Thus judicial deference to managerial resistance in
proxy battles would support the public choice theory.
A possible test case might be a challenge to a poison pill in the
context of a proxy contest. In Moran v. Household International, Inc. ,204
the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a twenty percent trigger in a
poison pill against a challenge that such a limitation on share ownership restricted shareholders' rights to conduct a proxy contest.205 The
court said that the trigger limitation would have minimal effect on the
waging of a proxy contest. As triggers have fallen from twenty percent
to as low as ten percent, and as managers have fortified their positions
by creating friendly voting blocs through the use of Employee Stock
Ownership Plans (ES0Ps), it is time to revisit the impact of poison pills
in proxy battles.206 The strongest challenge would be presented by an
insurgent who wanted to exceed the ownership trigger limitations
solely for purposes of a proxy battle, as shown by an offer to enter into
a standstill agreement with respect to a future acquisition of the firm. 207
Another implication of the socio-historical account is the emergence of legal distinctions regarding activity organized by institutional
and long-time shareholders versus activity organized by individuals and
very recent shareholders. Both of these variables, personality and recency, respond to the concerns about individualist self-seeking behavior that is part of the socio-historical view. Institutions represent many
individuals and groups, not just private buccaneers, and their activity,
ceteris paribus, should be favored under the socio-historical view. Similarly, activity by long-time stockholders reads as community members'
responses to their perception of a problem rather than a fast buck artist's efforts at exploitation. So, for example, one might predict greater
judicial hostility to a proxy battle organized by a raider who just
purchased ten percent of the firm's stock than to a contest organized by
a long-time holder with significant institutional support. By contrast, a
court's deference to management defensive tactics to thwart proxy activity even by a long-time holder would suggest an account grounded
on other concerns, most prominently public choice considerations.208
204. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
205. See id. at 1355.
206. For example, in the course of his two-year control contest for Lockheed, insurgent Harold Simmons was limited by a poison pill to 19.6% of Lockheed's stock, while
management built up the ESOP share ownership percentage to 24%. Simmons recently
sold his stock and gave up his proxy campaign. See Thomas C. Hays, Lockheed Fends
Off Simmons, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1991, at Dl.
207. Compare Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, lnc., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ,r 95,412, at 97,036 (Del. Ch. 1990) (obtaining revocable proxy would not
constitute "beneficial ownership" of stock for assessing ownership percentage under
poison pill, but other shareholder agreements in furtherance of proxy battle might).
208. A distinction in doctrine or practice regarding proxy battles in favor of the
long-term shareholder would not necessarily prove the case, however. A court motivated by public choice concerns might reason that stopping proxy battles brought by
raiders would be sufficient to protect the state's competitive position, given that contests
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Yet another possible implication is particular deference to defensive tactics aimed at forming a community of interest between a firm
and its workers. This goes to the heart of a claim that an economic
entity can embody certain important cultural values, such as loyalty and
community. Such a view would make intelligible a case like Shamrock
Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp. ,209 which held that the creation, in the
midst of a hostile takeover bid, of an ESOP holding fourteen percent of
the target's stock satisfied a test of "entire fairness" to the corporation.210 Ordinarily the imposition of a strict scrutiny test would resolve
the matter against the board. Here, the special employee relationship
elements underlying the. ESOP led the Court to sustain the tactic.
A socio-historical account might also generate a distinction that
some have argued regarding Paramount itself: the difference between
defending a preexisting merger plan and simply resisting a hostile bid.
A carefully investigated and negotiated merger represents some culmination of human efforts to plan for and shape the future. The merger
agreement represented the sorting out in advance of many difficult issues in addition to price: issues of control, sharing of power, and balancing of risks. Paramount's higher price represented the intrusion of
the market in human agency and could be rejected as such. The same
concerns would not exist in the ordinary case of management resistance to a hostile takeover. To be sure, management might argue for
the special status of its ongoing business plans, even if those plans were
just to remain independent, but a court sensitive to socio-historical
concerns might find that claim less compelling than the special case of
the preexisting merger.
CONCLUSION

The final question to ask is whether it is possible to distinguish a
socio-historical explanation from what might be called a deeply structured economic explanation. A socio-historical account touches on the
economic account at three points. First, it may be plausibly argued that
the success of a market-oriented system ultimately depends on the
flourishing of such values as loyalty and fairness. 211 The argument
would be that manager-to-shareholder duties (or employee-to-firm duties) cannot be adequately enforced through strictly bilateral enforcement mechanisms that arise out of a conception of the corporation that
gives shareholders the right to sell to the managerial team that
promises the highest return. To use the parlance of recent law and
initiated by long-term, previously-contented shareholders would be relatively
infrequent.
209. 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989).
210. Id. at 272-76.
211. For a broader account of this argument, see Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing
Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 23 (1989).
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economics scholarship, this is the claim that if the corporation is conceived of in contractualist terms, agency costs will always be very high.
Instead, the lowest cost enforcement of these duties depends on first
party enforcement mechanisms, that is, the internalization of values like
loyalty and fairness, which may act as a check on self-seeking behavior.
Insofar as hostile takeover bids erode those values-the socio-cultural
predicate for market capitalism, to put it somewhat grandly-they are
costly.
The positive externality argument for hostile takeovers, that they
provide· a general deterrent against managerial slack, can thus be
turned on its head: hostile bids impose negative externalities by reducing managerial and employee loyalty. But to take this economic argument seriously is to enter into a conundrum. Are hostile takeovers the
solution for managerial dereliction or the problem? If they are the
problem, how did they become so prevalent? Were hostile takeovers
economically desirable only on a small scale or because of a time lag in
management and employee perception? That is, only for the time
shareholders had the benefit of both first party and bilateral enforcement mechanisms, but no longer?
Second, the way that takeovers accelerated the rate of economic
change was a pivotal element in the socio-historical account. Rapid
economic change means greater social stress and greater pressure on
solidaristic values. Yet a checking mechanism against rapid, marketdriven change may serve economic ends as well. The origin of takeovers is in dispute. If takeovers are an effort to reorganize firms in response to fundamental changes in international product and capital
markets, then cutting back such activity (including the restructurings
undertaken by firms to avoid a hostile takeover) may impose high economic and social costs. But if takeovers are fueled principally by financial engineering born of capital market fads, then their social and
economic costs are wasteful. Moreover, markets have made serious
mistakes recently in judging organizational innovation, namely, the
conglomerate movement of the 1960s, which is now widely regarded a
failure.2 12 Is slowing the takeover market by putting the brakes on hostile acquisitions desirable on economic grounds, to give market participants time to analyze the returns to takeovers and decide whether they
bring about useful organizational innovation?213
212. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, From Competitive Advantage to Economic Strategy, Harv. Bus. Rev., May-June 1987 at 43, 45; David J. Ravenscraft & F.M. Scherer,
Mergers, Sell-Offs and Economic Efficiency 41-45, 209 (1987); Bhagat et al. supra note
79.
213. A further implication of this view is that management discretion to undertake
acquisitions ought to be checked by shareholder voting. This would require reworking
the legal rules that eliminate a vote by the acquiror's shareholders in a t_riangular
merger. See Note, Three-Party Mergers: The Fourth Form of Corporate Acquisition,
57 Va. L. Rev. 1242, 1251-52 (1971).
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Third, the socio-historical explanation is sensitive to the fact that
takeovers may have limited efficiency properties and valorize wealth
maximization over utility maximization. Even if shareholders are better
off as a result of takeovers, and their gains exceed all societal losses,
employees and other constituencies may be worse off, despite the fact
that they have not suffered an expropriation entitling them to a legal
remedy. In other words, takeovers may satisfy a Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
criterion, but not Pareto efficiency, and shareholders seem unwilling to
tax themselves to produce the Pareto result. 214 Moreover, even assuming money transfers that make employees as well off economically, employees may have lower utility. A large severance payment on top of a
"Mcjob" may leave the employee with the same income but a worse
life. How does the welfare economist or social theorist resolve this
problem in a theory of takeovers? 21 5 Could a court use its leverage
on corporate governance to ameliorate the transition costs of
capitalism?2 16
To develop a deeply-structured economic explanation for the
Paramount decision requires an answer to these and many other difficult
questions. There is no evidence that the Delaware Supreme Court undertook to grapple with them. In my view the court responded instead
from a different impulse, namely an effort to cabin the role of the market in corporate law. In other words, the court wanted to emphasize
the visible hand in the corporate system, against the market-driven imperatives of hostile takeovers.
214. For a discussion of these efficiency criteria, see Jules L. Coleman, Markets,
Morals and the Law 71-86 (1988). The same point might be made with respect to free
trade. The argument that "we" are better off, collectively, if the Japanese sell us
cheaper, better cars, ignores the laid-off U.S. worker who is worse off and the fact that
"we" seem unwilling to transfer part of our gains to cover the worker's transition costs.
215. Compare Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8
J. Legal Stud. 103 (1979) (rejecting utilitarianism in favor of wealth maximization); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 487 (1980) (defending wealth maximization) with Ronald M. Dworkin, ls Wealth a Value?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 191 (1980) (rejecting wealth maximization but also rejecting utilitarianism in favor of non-economic criteria of justice).
216. This is the subject ofan ongoing project.

